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Abstract
The development business has become much more complex in the past decade, with actors proliferating and 
collaboration fragmenting. This trend is characteristic of the change from collective action to what the authors 
term hypercollective action. Such a shift brings new energy and resources to international development, but 
also more difficulty managing global public policy. Severino and Ray use the lessons of the Paris Declaration—
the first large-scale effort to coordinate hypercollective action—as a starting point for envisioning a new 
conceptual framework to manage the complexity of current international collaboration. They offer concrete 
suggestions to improve the management of global policies, including new ways to share information, align the 
goals of disparate actors, and create more capable bodies for international collaboration.
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INNOVATIONS IN AID PUBLICATION SERIES; End of ODA (II) 
 
From its inception, the Center for Global Development has made its mark on issues of aid and 
aid effectiveness.  Many of our staff and non-resident fellows—Owen Barder, Michael Clemens, 
William Easterly, Carol Lancaster, Ruth  Levine, Todd Moss, Mead Over,  David Roodman, 
Arvind Subramanian, and myself, too—have been key contributors to a lively debate on the 
question of whether and how aid and the aid system work.*  
Though we normally include in our working paper and other series only analyses by CGD staff 
and non-resident fellows or analyses we commission ourselves for a particular program, in this 
special series we are pleased to publish from time to time at our discretion papers and essays 
prepared outside the Center.  Our aim is to share more broadly otherwise unpublished work in 
which  authors  propose  new  thinking  about  aid  and  the  aid  system  and  new  approaches  to 
operationalizing aid transfers. The focus will be on innovations—whether in ideas or operations.   
Our goal is that the Innovations in Aid series speeds and broadens access to new ideas, and 
contributes  to  more  effective  aid  programs—public  and  private,  bilateral  and  multilateral, 
traditional and new donors.  
In this paper, Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Ray continue their re-evaluation of overseas 
development assistance. Here they argue that old architectures for global collaboration are not 
sufficient to handle the shift from collective action to today‘s ‗hypercollective‘action. They push 
for and new, more open and comprehensive framework and offer concrete suggestion to make 
that  happen,  including  initiatives  to  share  knowledge  and  evaluation,  innovative  sticks  and 
carrots for governments and all civil society players to improve convergence; new generations of 


















The last decade has seen a radical transformation in the number and kind of actors involved in 
the development aid, international relief and global public goods industries – in both donor and 
recipient nations. This double trend of proliferation (i.e. the increase in the number of actors) and 
fragmentation (i.e. the scattering of donor activity) of international cooperation is characteristic 
of the shift from collective to ‗hypercollective action‘. While this evolution should be greeted 
with enthusiasm for the energy and additional resources it brings to global public policies,
1 it 
carries important efficiency costs. In this paper, we argue that steering complexity towards 
efficiency is one of the prime challenges for the governance of global public policies in the 
decades to come.  
The Paris Declaration is the first large -scale  effort  to  harness  the  ‗hypercollective‘  in  the 
development aid ecosystem. As such, it provides important lessons on international coordination 
processes in the new era of hypercollective action. While it starts from a convincing diagnosis of 
the problems, its incantations for donors to do more and better reveals an imperfect analysis of 
their  political  economy.  We  argue  that  what  is  at  stake  in  aid  effectiveness  is  less  the 
proliferation of actors (a trend that is here to stay) than the management of this proliferation in a 
way that addresses the faulty incentive structures of the actors of international cooperation. Four 
issues  are  in  particular  need  of  attention:  the  marginal  player  syndrome,  the  diverging 
accountability syndrome, the evaluation gap syndrome and the capacity-building paradox.  
As a consequence, in spite of all its merits, the Paris Declaration does not provide solid enough 
ground on which to build the kind of hypercollective action that is required by the burgeoning 
global public policies: it focuses on local issues (thus losing sight of upstream incoherence); it 
assumes  that  donors  are  driven  by  a  single  preference  function;  it  sees  aid  recipients  as  a 
homogeneous  whole;  and  it  relies  excessively  on  two  modes  of  collaboration  (rules  and 
standards).  
We argue that it is high time for a new conceptual framework to emerge, one which will help 
shape dynamic processes of multi-actor convergence that are more compatible with the political 
economy of international cooperation initiatives as they are taking shape in these early years of 
the 21st century. Improving actors‘ performances in the delivery of their share of the collective 
good will imply building a more open and comprehensive framework of collaboration for the 
provision of global public services – one which draws on the five threads of cooperation (rules 
and  agreements;  norms  and  standards;  systems  of  incentives;  information  and  discourses; 
networks and partnerships). These reflections lead us to suggest a new ambition for multilateral 
organizations  –  becoming  the  agents  of  effective  hypercollective  action.  It  also  leads  us  to 
suggest additional concrete steps which would improve the management of global policies, and 
specifically global development finance. They include knowledge, information and evaluation 
initiatives,  and  notably  an  ―IPCC‖  for  development;  innovative  sticks  and  carrots  for 
governments and all civil society players to improve convergence; new generations of coalitions 
and clubs. 
                                                 
1 See next page for a definition of the terms ‗global public policy‘/ ‗global public policies‘. 3 
 
Introduction 
In a previous paper
2, we announced the end of Official Development Assistance (ODA)  as we 
know it – the death of a policy born in the mid-20
th century.  
We showed that a new phoenix is rising from its ashes, and that this budding public policy, 
which links nations of the world in a variety of cooperative efforts, differs from its forebear in 
three  important  ways.  First,  its  tasks  go  far  beyond  those  of  traditional  development  aid  to 
address a larger set of global challenges. Secondly, its toolbox has itself expanded to include a 
whole range of financial and technical instruments
3. Thirdly, the number and kind of actors who 
drive  this global endeavour  has surged. This third trait of  official  development  assistance‘s 
troublesome  offspring  is  generating  a  major  governance  conundrum  for  international 
policymakers. This governance conundrum is what the present paper seeks to address.    
Building coherence among a highly fragmented array of players, each of whom driven by its own 
set  of  preferences  and  pursuing  a  great  diversity  of  policy  goals,  is  not  just  a  fascinating 
intellectual challenge. It is an imperious necessity. Indeed, if the state of global governance can 
be gauged according to this embryonic international public policy, there are reasons to worry: the 
multiple costs of the field‘s fragmentation are such that they jeopardize the ability to meet the 
daunting challenges that lay before us. From world summit to donor conference, the efforts to 
coordinate international action lead to results incommensurate with the stakes they are designed 
to meet.  
Despite multiplying signs of urgency, global undertakings to tackle global challenges continue to 
stumble  upon  policy  incoherence,  dispersion  and  free  riding  behaviour  that  plague  their 
efficiency. The clear and relatively consensual identification of a public ‗ill‘ (climate change, 
food insecurity, malaria, piracy…), the oftentimes impressive collective mastery of the tools 
needed to address it and the precise estimate of the means required to finance the effort flounder, 
at the stage of implementation, in the quicksand of collective action – or, as the number and 
diversity of stakeholders involved in these global endeavours have prompted us to rename it, 
‗hypercollective action‘
4. The disappointment of the December 2009 Copenhagen negotiations 
shows that it is no use mourning the foregone policy; the urgency lies in tending to the newborn
5.   
This paper aims to explore  a  new frontier of the  emergent  global public policy:  designing 
effective  processes  of  hypercollective  action.  It  begins  by  describing  the  maelstrom  that 
characterizes  efforts  of  international  cooperation, and  asks what we should underst and by 
‗coordination‘ when dealing with a constellation of actors moving in different directions and 
bereft of any overarching authority (1). It then examines some of the structural reasons why 
instances of coordination in the field of development assistance fail to address the root causes of 
policy incoherence (2). This analysis of the political economy of aid leads us to suggest a few 
                                                 
2 SEVERINO, JM. and RAY, O. (March 2009), “The End of ODA: Death and Rebirth of a Global Public Policy‖ in 
Center for Global Development Working Paper, (167). 
3 On the shifting mandates of development policy, see also Nancy Birdsall, ‗Reframing the Development Project for 
the 21st Century‘, keynote remarks at Conference on Building Our Common Future, DFID, March 2009. 
4 The concept of hypercollective action in the realm of international development was first explored in SEVERINO, 
JM. and CHARNOZ, O. (2008), De l’ordre global à la justice globale: vers une politique mondiale de régulation, 
vol. 2. En temps réels.. 
5 This, of course, may require addressing hereditary diseases that risk affecting the new policy as it did the old. 
Many of the concerns expressed in the economic literature of the 1990‘s (the macroeconomic sustainability of 
projects and programs, the fungibility of resources, the negative side-effects of large financial transfers…) remain 
valid, and require continued investment.  4 
 
simple principles and concrete steps to forge the convergence processes that will lay the basis of 
a more efficient system of international cooperation (3). 
 
1. The quest for effective collective action 
The last ten to twenty years have seen a radical transformation in the number and kind of actors 
involved in the development aid, international relief and global public goods industries – in both 
donor and recipient nations. This sudden surge of players involved in the management of global 
interdependences  has  considerably  enriched  the  ancient  industry  of  official  development 
assistance. It has dynamited old practices, bringing additional funding as well as new capacities.  
But  the  strength  of  this  emerging  global  policy  is  also  its  Achilles‘  heel.  Its  extreme 
fragmentation is a source of disorganisation that often verges on incoherence. While each actor 
brings an essential stone to the edifice, and while creativity and competition bring vital energy to 
the public policy, the latter‘s solidity will depend on their capacity to make their agendas and 
practices converge. Managing this bustling creativity is one of the prime challenges of global 
public policies for the years to come.   
 
‘Global Public Policies’ in the 21
st century 
The world of international cooperation is living challenging times in these early years of the 21
st 
century. In the space a decade, the world has had to face a structural security crisis revealed by 
the  9/11  attacks,  a  twin  food  and  energy  crisis,  a  mounting  climate  change  threat,  a  global 
financial crisis and a series of deadly global pandemics – all of which are underpinned by a 
global social divide between those who have (health, wealth, mobility… ‗capacity‘
6), and those 
who  have  not.  Although  none  of  them  are  new,  the  unprecedented  combination  of  global 
challenges to the welfare of humanity is putting international collective action to the test. 
These mounting global stakes have sparked an unprecedented boom in international cooperation 
initiatives.  In  the  sound  and  the  fury  of  diplomatic  summits,  NGO  gatherings  or  local 
cooperation initiatives, the world is witnessing the gradual emergence of international policies 
that aim to provide for a variety of global public goods: collective security, international health, 
environmental protection, financial stability, food security, poverty reduction, open trade, etc
7. 
Most of them are underpinned by financial tran sfers that aim to build the capacity of less 
developed nations tackle these issues of common  interest.  In the sense that they respond to 
citizens‘  demands  for  collective  services,  this  new  breed  of  global  policies  have  much  in 
common with the public policies that have emerged at the local, national or regional levels over 
the past centuries to tackle common welfare concerns. This is why, by analogy, we refer to them 
as ‗Global Public Policies‘. 
However, they differ from national or regional public policies in at least two important ways. 
First, they are not exclusively ‗public‘, as private actors play an important and increasing role in 
their  elaboration  and  delivery.  Second,  the  process  through  which  they  are  devised  and 
implemented is very different from the processes that generally gives rise to national policies. 
The present paper looks into the political economy of this global public policy-making process, 
                                                 
6 Or ‗capability‘, in the sense of Amartya Sen‘s ‗capability approach‘. SEN, A. (1992). Inequality Reexamined. 
Harvard University Press.  
7 See KAUL, I. Conceiçao, P., Le Goulven, K. and Mendoza, R.U (eds) (2003), Providing Global Public Goods: 
Managing Globalization. Oxford University Press.  And Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M.A. (eds) (1999), Global 
Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21
st Century, Oxford University Press.  5 
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GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY 
GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICIES 
and analyses the reasons for some of its shortcomings .  While  new-generation  development 
assistance is analysed  as an instance of this  complex policy-making process,  we believe that 
many of the dynamics we describe apply to other global public policies.   
In the same way that ‗public policy‘ at a national level can both refer to specific policies (health, 
education, etc.) and more generically to public action, ‗global public policies‘ refers to the set of 
thematic policies (such as international health, poverty-reduction or collective security) while 






















   
  1.1 An institutional jungle  
For most of its history, international development assistance was channelled from donor states to 
recipient  governments  though  traditional  bilateral  aid  programs.  Part  of  the  resources  were 
pooled between donor countries, and delivered through a few multilateral organizations. But this 
oligopolistic cooperation model of aid delivery has exploded in recent years, with the intrusion 
of a whole range of public, private and hybrid actors who each deliver a growing variety of 
public goods. In these early years of the 21
st century the scale of the challenges of international 
health, security, environmental degradation or poverty is such that making a difference in any of 
these fields implies bringing into motion a constellation of actors.  6 
 
 
Figure 1, Members of the GAVI Alliance 
In  the  nascent  world  of  global 
public policies, no single policy 
goal can be pursued effectively 
without bringing tens of players 
around  the  table.  Take 
international  health,  long 
characterised  by  the 
predominance  of  a  single 
multilateral  institution  –  the 
World  Health  Organisation  and 
a  few  international  donors. 
Today,  the  global  effort  to 
prevent or treat pandemics such 
as  HIV/AIDS  or  malaria 
involves a series of multilateral 
organisations (the WHO, but also the World Bank, UNITAID, UNICEF, regional actors such as 
the African Development Bank and others) and their offshoots (multi-donor funds such as the 
Global  Fund  to  Fight  AIDS,  Tuberculosis  and  Malaria),  bilateral  actors  (sometimes  several 
different  organisations  and  programs  per  donor  country),  Non-Governmental  Organisations 
(specialized NGOs such as Act Up, Doctors Without Borders or their counterparts in recipient 
countries), foundations (the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation has become a key actor in global 
health over the last decade), think tanks and institutes (such as the Institut Pasteur network), plus 
a few hybrid institutional animals (such as the GAVI Alliance, a platform of actors involved in 
the global effort to promote immunization). Although it is perhaps most striking in the domain of 
health, a sector in which over 100 major organizations are involved
8, the proliferation of aid 
actors is also a feature of global efforts for  environmental protection, humanitarian relief or  
education.  
Not only do  more and more  players take part in this policy, but they do so in  increasingly 
different ways. Each of them has its own world vision, body of doctrine and strategy, mobilises 
resources of various volumes and kinds, disburses them through distinct instruments, is equipped 
with its own procedures and answers to  their own  accountability systems. The result is that 
whether we turn to the protection of biodiversity, the fight against malnutrition  or debt relief, an 
incredible array of  discourses and  policy preferences coexist at one given time on one given 
issue. Of course, disagreements on global policies are as old as the policies themselves:  there 
was no such thing as  spontaneous order  in the days of traditional development aid.  But the 
relative  similarity  between  the  state  actors  around  the  table  made  it  easier  to  map  out 
disagreements,  negotiate  compromises  and,  eventually,  reach  common  decisions. Today  the 
unprecedented  heterogeneity of  the field‘s  actors  makes  it  difficult  to  identify  their  policy 
preferences, have them participate in discussion processes and ultimately converge.  
And we haven‘t seen anything yet! The continued growth in aid channels over the last two 
decades is not showing any sign of abating. On the contrary, within each category of actors, the 
trend is set towards expansion.  
                                                 
8  IDA  (May  2008),  ―Aid  Architecture:  An  Overview  of  the  Main  Trends  in  Oﬃcial  Development  Assistance 
Flows‖.  
The 
GAVI Alliance 7 
 
 
The demographic surge of global public finance 
Every year there are more, not fewer, multilateral agencies and programs. In the global struggle 
against  climate  change,  one  of  the  latest  babies  of  the  international  community  is  the 
International  Renewable  Energy  Agency  (IREA),  inaugurated  in  early  2009  by  some  77 
founding  member  states.  Its  mandate  is  to  promote  environmental  protection  through  the 
transition towards renewable energy, in part by accelerating the transfer of ‗green technologies‘ 
to  developing  nations.  Although  the  world  counts  an  International  Energy  Agency  (IEA),  a 
United  Nations‘  Environment  Program  (UNEP),  a  World  Bank,  large  bilateral  development 
agencies and NGOs, each of which have whole departments specialized in renewable energies, 
the founders of IREA preferred setting up a brand new  organization, endowed with its own 
funding, headquarters and staff. Promoting renewable energy is a desirable public goal. Yet the 
smooth insertion of IREA into the dense world of agencies will require intense negotiation, 
thorough  strategic  thinking  and…  important  coordination  costs.  While  dozens  of  such 
multilateral agencies have been created over the last decades, few have disappeared thus far: 
according to the OECD there are now 263 multilateral organizations active in development, i.e. 
more  than  the  world‘s  190-odd  countries,  and  four  to  five  times  the  number  of  developing 
countries they are meant to assist. 25 of them were created between 2000 and 2005
9.  
Multi-donor funds have also skyrocketed in recent years.  A recent fashion in the international 
community has been to create new sector-specific (or ‗vertical‘) funds to channel aid towards 
specific international public goods, particularly health, environment or education. By the end of 
2008, the World Bank alone held a total of $26.31 billion in 1,020 active funds, supported by 
224 sovereign and non-sovereign donor agencies
10. Some of these entities, such as the Global 
Environment Facility  (GEF), are endowed with their own council, assembly, secre tariat and 
CEO, which makes these hybrid institutional animals look a lot like multilateral organizations . 
As this paper is  being drafted, the  post-Copenhagen  climate negotiations  promise us a new 
climate fund, which will need to be coordinated with the  multitude of development programs 
already tackling climate challenges.  
A series of new bilateral donors (sometimes called ‗emerging donors‘) have also joined the club 
in recent  years, with their share of resources, development philosophies and agendas. While 
bilateral development aid in the 1960‘s essentially came from the United States, France and the 
United Kingdom, there are now close to 60 bilateral donors financing global policies today. 
Countries such as China, Mexico, Thailand or Romania, some of which receive World Bank 
loans, also manage their own bilateral cooperation development programs. Although there are 
very  few  reliable  statistics  available  on  non-DAC
11  aid, these  new  donors are  estimated  to 
channel two
12 to eight
13 billion dollars of ODA-equivalent to developing nations – a fast-growing 
chunk of international development finance.   
                                                 
9 KHARAS, H. (2007), ―Trends and issues in development aid‖, Wolfenson Center for Development Working Paper, 
(1), 15.  and KHARAS, H. (2009), ―Action on Aid, Steps Towards Making Aid More Eﬀective‖, Wolfenson Center 
for Development, 4. 
10 Partnership and Trust Fund Annual Report, 2008. 
11 DAC is the OECD‘s Development Aid Committee  
12 MANNING, R. (2006): ―Will‘Emerging Donors‘ Change the Face of International Co-Operation?‖, Development 
Policy Review, 24(4), 371–385. 
13  KHARAS,  H.  (2008),  ―The  New  Reality  of  Aid‖,  in  Global  Development  2.0,  Brainard  and  Chellet,  eds., 
Washington (Brookings).   8 
 
Traditional donors‘ bilateral actions are themselves often scattered between ministries, agencies 
and  vertical  programs.  This  is  typically  the  case  in  the  United  States,  where  more  than  26 
governmental  agencies  contribute  to  the  country‘s  international  development  effort,  among 
which five can be said to play a major role. A single developing country in one single year can 
therefore receive grants for its infrastructures from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), 
funds  for  HIV  treatment  from  USAID  though  PEPFAR,  emergency  relief  aid  from  the 
Department of Defence and benefit from the US Treasury‘s debt relief program.  
As if this impressive demographic vitality of multilateral and bilateral actors did not suffice to 
cloud the scene of global policies, subnational entities have initiated their own bilateral projects: 
networks of local government institutions in developed and developing countries are flourishing 
around the globe. These decentralized cooperation programs link a city or administrative region 
in a country of the North and its equivalent in a developing nation, and engage in projects in 
water and sanitation, education, environment or health. Close to 3,800 French local authorities 
(regions,  departments,  cities  and  city  groupings)  declare  being  engaged  in  decentralized 
cooperation  programs.  It  is  estimated  that  they  channel  over  100  million  euros  of  financial 
resources towards some 8,000 projects in 132 countries
14.   
Putting these different components of bilateral and multilateral aid together, it is no surprise that 
the number of donors operating per recipient country has skyrocketed in recent years. Efficient 
contraception is yet to be found to check public development finance‘s impressive demographic 
vitality: it is estimated that the average number of bilateral or multilateral donors per recipient 




 Privatizing international cooperation… with public support 
These numbers, however, do not include the myriad of private actors of international solidarity – 
some of whom finance operations that dwarf those of public organisations. Indeed, the end of 
state  monopoly  in  development  assistance  has  sparked  a  boom  in  private  giving,  actively 
encouraged by the governments of advanced economies through generous tax breaks.  
A whole range of left-wing, conservative, secular, faith-based, small, medium-size or large Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have mushroomed in all industrialized countries, and have 
come to represent a considerable proportion of North-South financial transfers. They now deliver 
about  a  third  of  the  international  programmable  assistance.  In  the  United  States,  private 
philanthropy  has  already  well  surpassed  official  development  aid
16.  Most  international 
development NGOs have field networks that no bilateral or multilateral agency could ever dream 
of developing – which make them important partners when it comes to linking with aid‘s final 
beneficiaries.  International  activities  of  NGOs  employ  more  than  the  staff  of  bilateral  and 
                                                 
14Figures from the French Minstry of Foreign Affairs: 
http://cncd.diplomatie.gouv.fr/frontoffice/article.asp?menuid=166&lv=2&aid=235  
15 IDA (May 2008), ―Aid Architecture: An Overview of the Main Trends in Oﬃcial Development Assistance 
Flows‖. 
16 Figures for 2007 show that the engagement of US private philanthropy with developing countries (an estimated 
$36.9 billion, which comes from adding international efforts of foundations, corporations, private and voluntary 
organizations, universities and colleges and religious organizations) far exceeded those of US Official Development 
Assistance ($21.8 billion). The Index of Global Philanthropy an Remittances 2009, The Hudson  Institute, 17.   9 
 
multilateral organisations combined
17. Over the space of twenty years, the world‘s international 
NGOs have become key players in the intricate global public goods industry.  
 
Despite  the  severe  impact  of  the  2008  financial  crisis  on  their  endowments,  philanthropic 
foundations have also considerably stepped up their funding to international cooperation and 
solidarity  activities  in  recent  years.  Foundations  in  the  United  States  are  estimated  to  have 
transferred a total of $3.3 billion to developing countries in 2007 – particularly in the domains of 
health, environment and education
 18. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation alone contributed 
$2.8  billion  to  international  solidarity  in  2008,  with  activities  in  more  than  100  different 
countries.  Thanks  to  its  massive  investment  in  vaccine  research,  it  has  become  one  of  the 
cardinal  players  of  international  health  policy,  with  considerable  influence  on  bilateral  and 
multilateral aid institutions. Since 1994, it has delivered over $20 billion worth of grants through 
its global development and international health programs – i.e. four times the GDP of Niger. 
European and Asian foundations are also increasing their international engagement, encouraged 
by increasingly generous tax incentives for private giving.  
 
Private businesses have also emerged as a growing component of international solidarity, as the 
line between for-profit and non-profit actions has thinned with the globalization of business. In 
parallel to the expansion of traditional philanthropy actions, corporate social and environmental 
responsibility (CSR) agendas and budgets have surged – providing precious resources and skills 
to local and global development efforts. Some companies present in countries with deficient 
public services have for example gone far beyond their legal obligation to provide for the health 
and  safety  of  their  employees  by  granting  access  to  health  treatment  to  the  communities 
surrounding the factories. Others are shifting their business strategies to provide essential goods 
and services to the ‗bottom of the pyramid‘
19 – i.e. some of the world‘s poorest communities. 
Transnational corporations have become crucial stakeholders of global efforts to fight public ills, 
as they now serve as vectors and agents of global public policies
20. The core strategy of some of 
these players interacts strongly with existing international public policies: when Danone, a major 
international food corporation, claims that its strategic mission is to ‗promote health through 
better nutrition‘ in developing countries, does it not take part in international collective action?  
 
Private  individuals  have  themselves  become  important  agents  of  this  budding  global  public 
policy – muddying the waters a little further. Every year more and more eminent public figures 
and ‗show-biz‘ celebrities decide to mobilize their renown in favour of the fight against poverty, 
hunger,  civil  war  or  desertification
21.  As public voices of specific endeavours,   the Kenyan 
activist  Wangari Maathai  or  the  Irish  artists  Bono  and Bob Geldof  have become  important 
stakeholders, with whom public actors must work. These ‗stars‘ of international development are 
invited  to  address  global  conferences  and  meet  heads  of  state  and  the  CEOs  of  the  largest 
international  banks  and  organisations.  Their  ideas  count,  as  they  sway  public  opinion  and 
political leaders – and therefore have considerable impact on the orientation given to the policy.  
                                                 
17  SALAMON,  L.,  and  S.  SOKOLOWSKI  (2004),  Global  Civil  Society:  Dimensions  of  the  Nonproﬁt  Sector, 
Volume Two. Bloomﬁeld, CT: Kumarian Press. 
18 The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2009, The Hudson Institute. 
19 PRAHALAD, C.K. (2004), The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid: Eradicating poverty through proﬁts, 
Wharton School Publishing. 
20  BEBEAR,  PROGLIO,  RIBOUD,  and  SEVERINO  (2008,  15  december):  ―Le  secteur  privé,  un  levier  du 
développement à ne pas négliger,‖ Le Figaro.  
21 WEST, D. (2007), ‗Angelina, Mia and Bono: Celebrities and International Development‘, in Development 2.0, op 
cit.  10 
 
And there is more to come! In just a few years, online loans and donations have brought yet a 
new type of actor onto the aid scene – one which weighs millions of dollars in small change. 
Kiva, an online microfinance platform, directly connects internet philanthropists throughout the 
world with micro-entrepreneurs in the South who need funds to start or grow their businesses. As 
of March 2010, a total of $124 million had been committed in 174,000 loans of an average of 
$398  to  entrepreneurs  from  52  developing  countries
22.  Relatively  small-scale  today,  e -
philanthropy is growing rapidly as social networks such as Facebook or Second Life spread the 
concept. For donors this peer-to-peer form of aid provides the advantage of going straight to the 
recipient, with concrete short-term, visible impacts. If this trend towards the decentralization of 
aid is to continue, the face of development aid may well change considerably.   
Proliferation does not only affect the supply side  in the balkanized market for  global public 
action.  As  governments  have  lost  the  monopoly  on  the  receiving  end,  t he  demand  for 
international cooperation has itself become extremely heterogeneous. Political liberalisation in 
many developing countries has led to the  emergence of a myriad of civil society organisations, 
who benefit from a large share of development funds. It is estimated that there are up to 30,000 
national NGOs in developing countries
23. At the same time the decentralization process at work 
in  many  countries  throughout  the  world  is  increasingly  turning  local  authorities  in to  aid 
recipients.  
  






























Source: authors  
 
                                                 
22 Statistics from www.kiva.org  
23 KHARAS, H. (2007), op cit.  11 
 
Hypercollective action: a whole new ball game 
This double trend of proliferation (i.e. the increase in the number of donors) and fragmentation 
(i.e. the scattering of donor activity) of international cooperation sets the stage for what we have 
called ‗hypercollective action‘. Although we will come back to its implications in the following 
sections, it may be worth to say a few words about this concept at this stage.  
We claim that the recent surge in the number of actors involved in the management of global 
challenges takes the world of international cooperation into a whole new ball game – one in 
which  the  rules  change  as  the  number  of  players  increases.  Indeed,  although  the  first 
characteristic of hypercollective action is the rapidly increasing number of actors that take part in 
a given policy, hypercollective action is not just about there being many more actors around the 
table.  These  actors  of  international  cooperation  are  also  much  more  heterogeneous  in  size, 
structure, processes and objectives than before. They each have their own form of legitimacy, 
very different motivations for engaging in the policy, very different understandings of what is 
meant by ‗development‘, ‗security‘ or ‗environmental protection‘, different assumptions as to 
how international action can contribute to these policy goals, and different discourses to explain 
the  policy  ecosystem  they  inhabit.  These  different  legitimacies,  motivations,  understandings, 
assumptions and discourses coexist, interact, and often oppose one another. In the absence of any 
legitimate arbitrator, there is no obvious way to articulate these views or to make them converge 
– which does not facilitate agreement on common objectives or rules of the game.  
In this sense hypercollective action is not just more collective action, but very different collective 
action.  This  new  mode  of  production  of  global  policies  is  reshuffling  the  way  international 
cooperation regimes operate. One of the consequences of this proliferation of actors is that the 
policy-making process is increasingly decentralised, and that the arenas where action-plans are 
devised and negotiated are more diverse. Rather than convening decision-makers delegated by 
their authorities in traditional international negotiations, these new policy negotiation processes 
increasingly involve the policies‘ ‗stakeholders‘ – i.e. individuals and institutions who have to be 
‗on board‘ for things to evolve. All policy stakeholders contribute in one way or another to 
policy design and implementation.  
To follow the sports metaphor, we are at a phase of international policies where thousands of 




  1.2 Jungle hazards 
Let us be clear: we are not pessimists of hypercollective action. On the contrary, we believe that 
the  surge  of  actors  involved  in  international  cooperation  offers  global  policy  financing  a 
welcome breath of fresh air, and that this exciting phase of international cooperation is one 
where new solutions will be found thanks to the cross-fertilization of very different experiences. 
Just as the extreme biodiversity of the world‘s jungles constitutes a wonder of the world, the 
diversity of this global public policy ecosystem needs to be preserved. Yet all jungles have their 
hazards, and we too are forced to recognize that the twin movement toward proliferation and 
fragmentation that characterizes the world of hypercollective action gives an awkward feeling of 
dizziness.  
Indeed, all signs point to the fact that there is no captain aboard the complex vessel of global 
public policy – on whose shoulders ultimately lies the response to some of humanity‘s greatest 
threats. The movement of this composite body of actors, bereft of any overarching authority or 
comprehensive regulation framework, gives no clear sense of direction. In fact it is more akin to 
pure Brownian motion, in which the frictions between its multiplying particles produce a Joule 
effect exponentially linked to their number. The dispersion of international collective action has 
gone  so  far  in  recent  years  that  it  carries  considerable  costs  in  terms  of  efficiency,  time, 
coherence and, ultimately, credibility for this emerging global policy. The nature and scale of 13 
 
these costs have been amply discussed in the case of international development assistance
24. Two 
types of  problems emerge as major hindrances to  global public policies‘ effectiveness in the 
world of hypercollective action: policy mismatch and capacity poaching.  
 
Policy mismatch 
The first instance of ‗policy mismatch‘ stems from the unhealthy competition between actors in 
the provision of policy advice in those recipient states where affirmed government leadership or 
inclusive  instances  for  national  policy  dialogue  are  lacking.  During  the  first  decades  of 
international development history, things were relatively simple: those countries who received 
funding  from  the  West  received  economic  advice  from  American,  Japanese  and  European 
ministries of international cooperation, while those who chose the Socialist camp implemented 
Maoist or soviet-style reforms. Informed commentators will make the point that this did not 
make donor strategies particularly efficient in themselves. Unfortunately, this is correct. Yet with 
the multiplication of donors in both kind and number (each donor coming with his vision of what 
constitutes  a  ‗good‘  health  or  education  policy  and  corresponding  funding  conditionality),  a 
developing country can now receive not only bad advice, but also its exact opposite (probably as 
poor) on the way to proceed on any given component of its development program at any given 
time. In the absence of an overarching donor authority the myriad of actors active in international 
cooperation feel bound by no common rules, and dispense their own policy advice based on their 
own agendas.  
Another particularly harmful type of policy mismatch caused by the current aid architecture is 
the lack of fit between donor interventions and local development priorities. This paradox often 
stems  from  the  excessive  concentration  of  international  public  support:  the  increasing 
earmarking of financial flows to fit donor priorities have led to difficulties in adapting funding to 
recipient  nations‘  most  fundamental  needs.  A  case  in  point  is  the  global  struggle  against 
HIV/AIDS and its encroachment on the funding of national health programs. A study on donor 
interventions in Rwanda shows that 75% of donor aid goes directly to NGOs or is managed by 
donors through their own projects. Because international donors have made HIV/AIDS one of 
their top global priorities, the bulk of this financing is dedicated to fighting this disease: $46 
million is earmarked for HIV/AIDS, $18 million for malaria and only $1 million for childhood 
illnesses. This is paradoxical in a country with a comparatively small 3% HIV/AIDS prevalence 
rate, but very high infant mortality rates (118 per 1000), where malaria kills more than AIDS but 
is far cheaper to treat and where the government has made the access to essential health services 
its  top  priority
25.  The result is that HIV -positive mothers are given  sophisticated retroviral 
treatments, but still cannot obtain even the most rudimentary of obstetric and gynaecological care 
or infant immunizations.
26 As Zambia‘s minister of health observed, ―there is no point giving a 
child drugs to treat HIV if they then drink infected water and die of cholera‖
27.  
                                                 
24 See for example European Commission (2009), Aid Effectiveness Agenda : Benefits of a European Approach. A 
study on the price of fragmentation.  
25 IDA (2008): ―Aid Architecture: An Overview of the Main Trends in Oﬃcial Development Assistance Flows‖, p. 
17. 
26 GARRETT, L. (2007), ―The Challenge of Global Health‖, Foreign Aﬀairs, 86(1). 
27 Quoted in the Financial Times, From Symptom to System, September 28, 2007.  14 
 
Figure  3,  International  funding  for  HIV/AIDS,  Malaria  and  the  Integrated  Management  of 
Childhood Diseases (IMCI) in Rwanda (source: IDA 2008) 
 
 
The third policy mismatch that can be traced back to this institutional jungle is the unsatisfactory 
allocation  of  international  aid  across  sectors  and  geographies.  In  this  fragmented  and 
increasingly decentralized policy world, no overarching instance is responsible for ensuring a 
rational allotment of funds, such that the bulk of aid is channelled to whatever is fashionable for 
donors to fund and wherever it is trendy to work at a given moment in time. Given the varying 
ability  of  lobbies  to  attract  attention  to  their  cause,  global  efforts  toward  certain  causes  or 
countries are relatively over-financed, while other crucial public policies and regions remain 
orphans  of  international  aid.  This  generates  duplication,  overlap  and  a  waste  of  precious 
resources.  
The  Central  African  Republic  has  long  been  a  typical  ‗aid  orphan‘,  stuck  in  the  grey  zone 
between humanitarian and development assistance (figure 4); its population subject to the double 
penalty of having a weak government and little external support. It is not difficult to conceive 
that each donor has an inherent interest in investing its funding in those developing countries 
where it is likely to produce maximum effects and visibility, hoping that the rest of the donor 
community will take care of the others.  
Figure 4, Official aid flows to the Central African Republic (CAR) Source: T.Lanzer, UNDP 
 
 
However, this perfectly rational choice of individual donors has very detrimental effects on aid‘s 
overall effectiveness, both in aid darling and aid orphan countries. One of the corollaries of this 
gregarious donor behaviour is the volatility of aid flows. Although one might expect that the 
fragmentation of aid actors would help reduce the volatility of aid, it appears instead to have 15 
 
increased  in  recent  years
28  –  as  most  development  actors  respond  to  similar  incentives  in 
deciding to increase or decrease their aid commitments. Recent research suggests that aid shocks 
faced by low income countries are comparable in size and frequency to major global economic 
shocks such as the Great Depression or the two World Wars
29.    
In sum, states receiving international support get the worst of rec ent evolutions in the policy‘s 
architecture: excessive fragmentation of policy advice combined with the risk generated by the 
excessive concentration of financial support.   
 
Capacity poaching  
The second hazard of the institutional jungle which characterises development assistance is also 
well documented. It is the considerable administrative burden placed by a crowded aid industry 
on recipient states confronted with weak administrative capacities
30. A study has shown that 
thirty-eight  developing  countries  deal with  twenty-five  or more  active bilateral donors and 
international organizations on their territory  – notwithstanding the myriad of actors from the 
worlds of international NGOs, foundations and decentralized cooperation
31. Each of these donors 
requires  availability from  national and local authorities ,  as well as  the provision of  time-
consuming reports to monitor the advancement of projects and the use of funds. This absorbs 
precious  administrative capacity, which cannot be deployed for  national  development.  Such 
practices do not stand well with the capacity-building refrain chanted in chorus by these same 
donors.   
Knack and Rahman have found that bureaucratic quality erodes more in recipient countries with 
greater donor fragmentation, i.e. a large number of donors who each work on a small share of the 
projects.  They  find  that  ―in  their  need  to  show  results,  donors  each  act  to  maximize  the 
performance of their own projects, and shirk on provision of the […] human and organizational 
infrastructure essential for the country‘s overall long-term development.‖
32 They also emphasize 
the detrimental effects of donor ‗poaching practices‘ of qualified local staff, which amounts to a 
form of brain drain: in countries where administrative capacities are scarce, donors‘ generous 
payrolls  compete  with  the  national  private  and  public  sectors  for  skilled  labour.  In  some 
countries senior officials work for internationally-funded NGOs in addition to (or in place of) 
their poorly-paid government position. Others prefer to leave the civil service to work directly 
for foreign donors, where they can expect to earn ten to fifteen times more
33.   
                                                 
28 KHARAS, H. (2007), ―Trends and issues in development aid‖, Wolfenson Center for Development Working 
Paper, (1), 20.  
29 KHARAS, H. (2007), op cit.  
30 KNACK, S., and RAHMAN, A. (2004), ―Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients‖, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (3186). 
31 OECD DAC (January 2008), ―Development Co-Operation Report 2009‖. 
32 KNACK, S., and RAHMAN, A. (2004), op cit. 
33 MICHAILOF, S. (December 2009), ―The Seven Capital Sins of the Donor Community in Afghanistan‖, GMF 
Policy Brief. 16 
 
2. Why traditional solutions won’t do  
The  diagnosis  is  now  clear,  and  the  consensus  largely  shared  among  actors  of  international 
cooperation  that  the  multiple  costs  of  proliferation  and  fragmentation  call  for  urgent 
improvements in the governance of these emerging – and balkanized – global public policies. 
There  is,  however,  no  consensual  blueprint  on  how  to  proceed  to  instil  some  order  in  this 
institutional jungle. This section will try to show that coordination solutions tested in the field of 
development assistance have been met with semi-successes at best because they have not kept to 
pace with the changing nature of international collective action. As such, they have failed to 
address some of the root causes of incoherence.   
 
2.1. The ‘suicidal’ and ‘gosplanist’ temptations 
It remains to be determined what principles can structure effective hypercollective action.  What 
we know for sure is that pitfalls abound; let us begin by exploring two ideological dead-ends on 
the road to better coherence. 
  
Back to the “Old Boys’ Club” 
 
Some who lament the increasing fragmentation of international cooperation would like to go 
back to the ‗good old days‘ of traditional development aid, when a few bilateral and (even better 
in most minds!) multilateral institutions monopolized the business of North / South cooperation. 
This idea is appealing in theory: if the rising number and diversity of actors is responsible for 
swelling costs, improving coherence and efficiency would call for reducing them in one way or 
another. But is this really what the international community should strive to achieve?   
This question was raised very concretely in the 1990‘s, in the context of European integration: 
some argued that it was absurd to have as many aid agencies as member states, and called for the 
creation of a single European aid agency to deliver Europe‘s aid effort. However, full integration 
of European development aid institutions was not the path chosen – on solid grounds. Indeed, 
although each European bilateral donor delivers ‗European‘ aid, they do not deliver the same 
kind of support: German, French, Spanish, Danish, Swedish and British aid agencies each bring a 
specific technical and geographic know-how, which gives much of its added-value to European 
aid. Integrating these bilateral aid efforts into one gigantic European aid agency would not only 
have transferred much of the coordination costs to a supersized centralized structure, thereby 
further constraining European aid disbursement, but it would also have threatened these precious 
specificities.  
The assumption that policy effectiveness will be boosted through an attrition of players also 
tends to underestimate the sheer difficulty of reducing their number in a world of ‗international 
anarchy‘
34. Assuming that better policy  coherence would indeed call for  fewer actors in the 
game, how likely is it that any player of the mushrooming field of international  cooperation 
would accept to disappear? As we have seen, the trend we are witnessing today is not one of 
decline, but on the contrary one of steady increase of bilateral, multilateral and private actors. 
Among these new players, few would accept institutional hara-kiri on the ground that the field 
has  now  become  ‗overcrowded‘–  since  all  deem  to  have  entered  the  scene  of  international 
cooperation for good reasons in the first place. Traditional actors of international cooperation are 
                                                 
34 We refer here to the absence of any overarching global authority, that John Hobbes pointed to in 1651 in 
Leviathan - or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil. 17 
 
certainly  not  ready  to  leave  their  place  to  newcomers  either,  as  their  long  experience  in 
delivering technical and financial support gives them a strong sense of legitimacy.  
More importantly perhaps, aid recipients themselves would certainly resist efforts to reduce the 
number of actors present in their country as with each new player of international cooperation 
comes the hope of additional funding – or at least a new card to play in the vast diplomatic game 
of  global public policies. Thus, however much one thinks it ought to  happen, the voluntary 
retreat  of state or non-state actors from  given recipient  countries  on any significant  scale  is 
politically unlikely. And, in the absence of an overarching international authority responsible for 
overseeing the delivery of global public goods and essential services, there are no means to 
enforce compulsory disengagement. Who would have the legitimacy, let alone the authority, to 
decide who stays  and  who leaves?  It  has  proven difficult  enough in  recent  years for a few 
European bilateral donors to withdraw from certain sectors in a few countries where they clearly 
did not have a comparative advantage.  
Whether we applaud or lament it, the genie will not go back into the bottle. The costs associated 
with proliferation of both donors and receivers are here to stay, and can be seen as the price to 
pay for a dynamic and innovative development aid system. While we can  certainly work to 
reduce  these  costs,  they  should  be  factored  into  realistic  appraisals  of  the  future  aid 
architecture
35. Moreover, as we have seen, d iversity is not the problem . Incoherence is. And 
incoherence is what donor coordination efforts should aim to reduce.  Because it is neither 
possible nor desirable, institutional suicide is not the Holy Grail of aid effectiveness.   
   
Erecting a Leviathan 
Another popular misconception, particularly fashionable in development aid bureaucracies, is 
that  the  solution  will  come  from  the  establishment  of  a  vast  aid  coordination/harmonisation 
machinery,  composed  of  regular  high-level  meetings  on  donor  coordination,  permanent 
headquarter collaboration structures and their equivalents in the field, plus a series of donor 
‗codes of conduct‘. Assuming that the contemporary world of global policies is akin to John 
Hobbes‘  international  anarchy,  Gosplanists  see  the  solution  in  establishing  a  coordination 
Leviathan.   
Clearly  the  costs  of  ill-coordination  amongst  donors  represent  a  considerable  burden  for  all 
actors of the field, and ought to be reduced. Yet it remains to be seen how they fare compared to 
the costs of a centralized coordination machinery. From year to  year, the latter is becoming 
increasingly burdensome for donor countries and international agencies, who dedicate a good 
deal of their time, energy and resources to donor meetings – both at the field and headquarter 
levels. In each development agency, entire departments have been staffed with bright experts to 
handle the gargantuan task of ‗donor coordination‘. Rather than searching for optimal strategies 
to  respond  to  recipient  states‘  needs,  a  lot  of  their  energy  is  spent  trying  to  convince  their 
counterparts that their institution‘s strategy is optimal. At the field level ‗donor coordination 
secretariats‘ have been set up, dedicated exclusively to this purpose
36! While coordination costs 
(theoretically borne by donors) could be accepted as a lesser evil in order to reduce incoherence 
costs (often borne by recipient countries), we must ensure that the former do not overly exceed 
                                                 
35 SEVERINO, JM. and CHARNOZ, O. (2008), De l’ordre global à la justice globale: vers une politique mondiale 
de régulation, vol. 2. En temps réels. 
36 A technical secretariat (STELA) was created by the donors active in Burkina Faso in 2005 to implement the 
recommendations of the Rome and Paris Declarations.   18 
 
the savings in terms of the latter
37. At times it seems that coordination and harmonization efforts 
are the Sisyphus tasks of donor agencies. Used generously in some circumstances and sparingly 
in others, they have led to sub -optimal  equilibriums. Several years down the path of donor 
coordination, the time has come to analyse the comparative merits of Gosplan and anarchy – or, 
to  put  it  in  a  more  appropriate  way,  to  undertake  a  serious  cost-benefit  analysis  of  donor 
coordination efforts
38.   
A likely finding would be that the slope of the coordination cost curve increases t he further 
collaboration efforts  are pushed: the more donors try to attune their approaches, the more 
difficult it gets  – as they move from easy steps of information-sharing to difficult changes to 
their core strategies
39. What this means is not that coordination and harmonisation costs ought to 
be reduced, but that they should be assessed relative to their gains – at a time when demands are 
rising in recipient nations for rapid responses to urgent problems
40.  
Coordination and harmonization of donor practices are not end in themselves, but should always 
remain means to deliver more effective aid. More coordination and harmonisation is not always 
better:  there  is  an  optimal  level  of  cooperation  and  harmonisation,  which  allows  for  better 
coherence while leaving space for a healthy level of diversity and emulation.  














































                                                 
37 Under the – reasonable– hypothesis that donor costs are opportunity costs for development, and that donor savings 
ultimately benefit recipient nations. 
38 Such a study has been launched by the Agence Française de Développement: ―Regards croisés sur l‘aide au 
développement‖, internal document, AFD 2009.   
39 KHARAS, H., and HERMIAS, J. (February 2008), ―Competition, Not Coordination: Making European Foreign 
Aid More Eﬀective‖, Development and Cooperation, 49(2). 
40 A case in hand was the seminar organized in 2008 by the President of Senegal on donor effectiveness. It became 
clear in the course of discussions that, for many aid recipients, donor reactivity and capacity to adapt to needs 
expressed by the beneficiaries constitutes an important element of aid effectiveness. Traditional donors tied to the 
rules of the Paris Declaration were estimated not to fare as well as emerging donors such as China or India, who 
were bound by less red tape and could respond in a few months to funding demands in just about any sector.  19 
 
  2.2 The Paris Declaration: too much, too little?  
 
These thoughts lead us to take a closer look at the ‗Paris Declaration‘, which appears as a first 
attempt to tackle international policy coordination problems in the field of development aid
41. 
The framework developed in the Declaration on Aid Effectiveness‘ five key principles (and the 
Accra ‗Agenda for Action‘ of September 2008) were meant to orient the donor community‘s 
actions and pave the way for greater efficiency. What can we learn from this attempt to improve 
international policy coherence? Can the principles on which the Paris Declaration is based serve 
as a model to organise effective hypercollective action and structure emerging global public 
policies?    
 
A (very) rough draft 
The Paris Declaration process provides a consensual statement of the problem, and affirms the 
necessity for the donor community to march towards common goals. As such, it represents a 
crucial  landmark  on  the  path  towards  coherence.  At  the  Third  High  Level  Forum  on  Aid 
Effectiveness in Accra, discussions on aid coordination were led jointly by representatives of 
both donor and recipient countries, which marked the beginnings of a North/South approach to 
the governance of aid. Yet, outside the walls of conference halls (within which the five principles 
of ‗ownership‘, ‗alignment‘, ‗harmonization‘, ‗managing for results‘ and ‗mutual accountability‘ 
resonate as would a profession of faith), there is a rising sense of unease within the development 
community with the way this ‗donor consensus‘ is being played out in practice
42. According to a 
growing number of critics, the Paris Declaration process suffers from a number of weaknesses 
that make this laudable attempt at international coordination a weak foundation on which to build 
the kind of hypercollective action that is needed to manage emerging global public policies.  
The main reason for this is that it has failed to take into account the revolution that has affected 
development aid‘s objectives, actors and instruments – as if the Paris Declaration has set itself to 
regulate  an  activity  (the  delivery  of  traditional  ‗Official  Development  Assistance‘)  that  has 
already ceased to exist as such
43. Indeed, many say that  the Paris Declaration has missed the 
wave of instrumental innovations that has challenged development aid practices over the last 
decade
44. Its coordination efforts focus on the narrow perimeter of grants and technical assistance 
– to the detriment of the vast array of instruments that have been developed in recent years to 
assist  national  or  local  development  strategies.  As  a  result,  a  binary  aid  landscape  is  under 
construction  in  many  recipient  countries:  an  inter-donor  framework  to  manage  grants  and 
sovereign lending, neatly structured according to the principles of the Paris Declaration, coexists 
with a proliferating field of ‗other‘ development methods and initiatives. A donor with only 10% 
of its portfolio worth of grants and ODA-eligible loans will therefore be concerned with the Paris 
Declaration  coordination  agenda  for  only  10%  of  its  activity!  Its  non-concessional  loan, 
guarantee or equity investment projects fall outside the bounds of the Declaration – although 
                                                 
41 Ian Goldin and Tiffany Vogel embark on a similar exercise with respect to the governance of financial commons. 
They, too, find that existing institutions are inadequate to protect the international community against 21
st century 
systemic risks. Goldin, GOLDIN, I., and VOGEL, T. (2010), ―Global Governance and Systemic Risk in the 21st 
Century: Lessons from the Financial Crisis‖, Global Policy, 1(1). 
42 See BIRDSALL, N., and K. VYBORNY (August 2008), ―A Little Less Talk: Six Steps to Get Some Action from 
the Accra Agenda‖, Center for Global Development Notes. 
43 SEVERINO, JM., RAY, O., 2009, op cit.  
44 For a description of this instrumental revolution, please refer to SEVERINO, JM. and RAY, O., (March 2009), 
―The End of ODA – Death and Rebirth of a Global Public Policy‖, Center for Global Development Working Papers. 20 
 
they may well concern the exact same sectors. In this uncharted territory institutional anarchy 
still rules, and the donor is free to proceed at its discretion in terms of strategy and procedure.  
The Paris Declaration process is also structured as if the explosion in the number and kind of 
actors involved in development aid hadn‘t happened, both on the donor and recipient sides. As 
an OECD project, the Paris Declaration did not include the new bilateral donors or the non-state 
organisations involved in the policy – and thus left aside the most dynamic part of international 
aid flows. Of course, civil society organisations are represented at most donor conferences; the 
Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was an important step in giving them a greater 
role in terms of policy input. However there is to this day no central framework to coordinate 
public and private aid flows to a given country or sector, such that each bilateral donor engages 
in its own bilateral outreach initiatives to foundations, NGOs, think tanks and emerging donors. 
Naturally, part of the inherent difficulty of dealing with the proliferation of aid channels is that 
diverse actors cannot be managed in the same way. However, excluding the bulk of them from 
coordination  efforts  on  the  grounds  that  they  are  different  seems  a  little  radical,  and  risks 
exacerbating the duality of the aid landscape
45.   
More fundamentally perhaps, evaluations show that the Paris Declaration process gives players 
in the system few motivations to play the coordination game genuinely – which may explain why 
considerable donor incoherence persists despite repeated statements of good intentions from all 
parties
46. The current incentive mix leads many actors to adopt the  coordination lingo, but to 
make their practices evolve only marginally in practice. Too little notice has been paid to the 
incitements that would be needed for the different actors to implement them . Frameworks for 
hypercollective action will need to address the political economy of cooperation
47. We will come 
back to this crucial point in the third part of the paper.    
 
Supply or demand-driven aid?  
While the Paris Declaration starts from a good analysis of the difficulties that affect aid‘s supply-
side (i.e. the donor community), many critics highlight that it fails to recognize the extreme 
diversity of the demand for aid.  It relies on a set of implicit assumptions on the needs and 
capacity of aid recipient states. The ideal-typical ‗recipient state‘ is poor, very dependent on 
international aid, and it has sufficient administrative capacity to carry out projects and define 
credible national policies. A more subtle appraisal of the heterogeneity of demand would reveal 
that  coordination  processes  of  the  Paris  declaration  are  very  useful  under  a  specific  set  of 
circumstances – but which only account for a small share of country situations.  
Consider  the  recommendation  to  align  donor  procedures,  development  policies  and  funding 
priorities to those of partner countries: this makes a lot of sense in theory, as we cannot expect 
recipient  countries  to  pay  the  price  of  procedural  cacophony,  instrumental  proliferation  and 
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Red Cross and Red Crescent networks.  
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carried out, including Bernard Wood et. Al., ‗Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration‖, July 2008. 
These various exercise all point to the slow implementation of the commitments and targets agreed on in Paris in 
2005.  
47 BARDER, O. (October 2009): ―Beyond Planning: Markets and Networks for Better Aid,‖ Center for Global 
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strategic incoherence among donors. But the developing world covers the whole spectrum of 
institutional capacities.  
On the ‗weak capacity‘ end of the spectrum this principle is very theoretical: calls for tenders and 
anti-money laundering procedures are either lacking or not to be trusted, policies are poorly 
devised, and government priorities more often reflect those of a political elite than those of the 
population. A real difficulty of delivering aid in these cases lies in the inbuilt disequilibrium 
between supply and demand: the (at times) irrational behaviour of ‗customers‘ calls for exerting 
some form of tutelage on ‗demand‘. The way this plays out in practice is that donors set the 
national procedures, policies and priorities on which their strategies are then aligned: in some 
countries, the government‘s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is even written by World Bank or 
UNDP staff from start to finish. Is this breach of the principle of alignment necessarily bad? No: 
at times the donor community is right to impose its conditions. However, pretending in these 
circumstances that donors align themselves on the government‘s strategy and are ‗accountable‘ 
to the government sheds legitimate doubts on the principle of alignment, ownership and mutual 
accountability, and on the true objectives of donor coordination.  
While alignment on national policies and procedure makes little sense in those states that do not 
have sufficient capacity to express or define their needs, donor harmonization, on the other hand, 
is crucial. Post-conflict states are a typical case – one in which donors have paradoxically tended 
to  rush  to  in  a  precipitated  and  disorganised  fashion.  For  Afghanistan,  the  Central  African 
Republic or Haiti, uncoordinated aid can indeed do a lot of harm: not only does competition 
between  donors  risk  confusing  or  overwhelming  government  institutions  that  are  under 
considerable  strain,  but  donor  dispersion  may  also  be  used  by  certain  authorities  to  finance 
inadequate policies. In these cases foreign donors are right to aim at offering a coherent strategy 
through upstream  donor coordination.  Clearly, in  some countries  the disequilibrium between 
supply and demand is such that the ‗market for aid‘
48 left to itself cannot be efficient: donor 
harmonization  is  the  least  harmful  way  to  provide  effective  aid.  Rather  than  alignment  on 
inadequate demand, the top priority ought to be building the capacity to define coherent policy 
needs on the part of government authorities.  
 
Towards the other pole of the state capacity continuum, things look very different. In a growing 
number of countries eligible to development assistance, demand for aid is highly organized and 
structured. The national and local authorities are able to elaborate a sophisticated demand based 
on the needs of their economies. They perceive development aid as a resource among others 
(FDI,  market  loans  and  bond  emissions)  to  finance  their  public  policy  priorities.  In  these 
countries competition between donors is not a concern, quite the contrary: authorities find that it 
spurs  innovation  and,  more  importantly  perhaps,  forces  donors  to  align  their  action  to 
government priorities. The authorities are able to choose the level of coordination they deem 
most efficient, and organize it themselves: in Vietnam, India, Brazil, Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco 
or China, government authorities did not wait for the Paris Declaration to ensure the coordination 
of aid. Because their bureaucracies do not lack competent staff, they prefer to cope with donor 
coordination costs – as this allows considerable gains in terms of ownership.  
These states are in no need of an integrated offer; in fact most of them resent any form of 
upstream  donor  cooperation  that  would  cause  them  to  face  a  cartel  of  donors.  Government 
authorities provide carrots and sticks for donors – who better keep to the government‘s strategies 
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Global Development Working Paper No.4. And KLEIN M. and HARFORD T. (2005) The Market for Aid, The 
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if they want to continue working in the country. These states are in a very different power 
relationship toward the aid community, as they can afford to refuse funding when it does not fit 
national priorities, or to kick out an unruly donor. This is what Brazil made clear when it decided 
to launch a rainforest protection fund: the Strategic Affairs Minister Roberto Mangabeira Unger 
warned that the $21 billion environmental fund will be a way for foreign governments to support 
Brazil's initiatives "without exerting any influence over our national policy‖, making it crystal 
clear that "we are not going to trade sovereignty for money"
49. The authorities of such partner 
countries are at best ambivalent about the Paris Declaration . They are used to ordering ‗à la 
carte‘ among donor projects, advice and policy options. Harmonisation efforts sound like an 
attempt by donors to move to a set menu.  
Somewhere in between these two poles of the capacity continuum are countries where the Paris 
Declaration principles are well adapted,  and their  implementation  brings  satisfaction to  both 
government authorities and DAC donors. This is typically the case in Mozambique, Ghana or 
Burkina Faso: although the coordination process needed to reach  common strategy is often time-
consuming, the increasing recourse to budget support has brought considerable improvements in 
terms of capacity, government ownership and coherence.  
What should we take away from this dissection of the demand for aid? The problem is not so 
much the principles of the Paris Declaration than their uniform application to the whole range of 
beneficiaries.  According  to  the  capacity-building  discourse  of  aid  agencies,  international 
assistance ought to aim to move recipient countries from the ‗weak governance‘ pole of the 
continuum to the ‗strong capacity‘ end – which implies progressively leaving the coordination of 
donor activity to the receiving state. In a way, the Paris Declaration donor coordination processes 
should  aim  at  their  own  extinction  as  countries  move  up  the  scale  of  capacities  and  donor 
coordination. Is the aid community ready to accept this vision of alignment? The lack of interest 
of the donor community to fund Brazil‘s rainforest protection fund suggests that true alignment 
remains rare in practice. 
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The double trap  
Finally, the Paris declaration seems to be caught in two policy traps.  
The first is the ‗participation‘ trap. As coordination groups have proliferated on any local policy 
issue, from gender to power generation, the process has degenerated into a discussion nightmare 
in many countries, where small donors may freeze policy-making for years. In most countries, a 
few donors represent the bulk of development assistance. In Ethiopia, four donors
50 provide over 
60% of the financial support to the country.  Yet, consulting the ultimate donor (who provides 
less than 1% of overall aid) may monopolize the attention of the  government or entire donor 
community if this donor  has chosen to play  the obstruction game.  In this case the laudable 
objective of giving all actors a voice is counterproductive. 
The second trap lies consists in placing the onus of improvement in aid delivery on actors that do 
not have all the cards in their hands: the bulk of coordination efforts take place at the field level, 
while  most  field  actors  have  in  effect  little  capacity  to  adapt  disbursement  policies  and 
regulations.  Indeed,  the  latter  are  often  decided  upon  at  the  central  level   by  boards  and 
parliaments  who are  unaware of  local realities and primarily concerned by safeguard and 
reporting policies. Rushing to the field is developers‘ Eve‘s temptation; it has naturally been the 
Paris Declaration‘s. But when it comes to improving the coherence of global policies, a good 
dose of heavy lifting has to be done at the central level. It is with the fight against poverty, 
                                                 
50 The United States, the European Union, the World Bank and the United Kingdom.  24 
 
climate change or global pandemics as in all battles: combat on the front lines can only be 
efficient  if  headquarters  do  not  hamstring  the  infantry  with  untenable  rules  of  engagement. 
Convergence and efficiency have to be addressed at all decision-making levels.       
Excessively participatory, the Paris Declaration process is also stuck at the local level, such that 
it can deliver only with great difficulty the efficiency improvements it promised.  
 
  2.3 De rerum cognescere causas
51 
How can so much work and goodwill on improving aid effectiveness through coordination lead 
to such disappointing results? Let us venture a hypothesis: while the Paris Declaration starts from 
a  convincing diagnosis  of the problems, success  is  out  of reach because its  incantations for 
donors to do more and better miss some of the root causes of incoherence. Rather than accusing 
actors of bad will, more attention should be given to the political economy of our emerging 
global public policies in the context of hypercollective action.  
Three syndromes and a paradox appear as in particular need of attention. 
 
The marginal player syndrome 
We call the first perverse incentive the ‗marginal player syndrome‘ – a pure product of the recent 
explosion in stakeholders of international cooperation. It refers to the situation where donors feel 
less and less responsible for the success or failure of the projects and programs to which they 
contribute – due to the fragmentation of aid supply.  
Given that the overall cash transfers to the field have not significantly increased over the years, 
the  mushrooming  of  development  actors  has  implied  that  the  average  size  of  projects  or 
operations  financed  has  decreased  sharply  –  especially  with  the  eruption  of  NGOs  and 
decentralized cooperation. In 2006 the OECD reported over 81,000 active aid projects worldwide 
(up from 17,000 in 1996!), the median size of each activity representing only $67,000. In this 
market where most players are marginal, no single actor feels accountable for the final results. 
The consequence is that all players who consider that they only bring a small stone to the vast 
development  edifice  do  not  feel  concerned  by  coordination  efforts.  Why  would  they  bother 
joining  costly  harmonisation  processes?  This  perverse  incentive  brought  by  hypercollective 
action  is  not  addressed  by  the  Paris  Declaration.  On  the  contrary,  as  donors  increase  their 
contributions into common financing pools and reduce the number of projects over which they 
have direct responsibility, their stakes in success are further diluted.  
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Figure 7, Number of donors per recipient country. (Source : IDA 2008, p. 15) 
 
 
The diverging accountabilities syndrome  
The second lies in the coexistence of at least three systems of accountability in international 
cooperation policies, from which we cannot expect spontaneous convergence.  
Who do development institutions work for? To whom should they be accountable? According to 
whose needs and objectives should aid‘s effectiveness be assessed? One answer is that donors 
work to assist partner governments in their national development strategies, and should therefore 
aim to respond to their demands (this is what the Paris Declaration principle of ‗alignment‘ is all 
about). Another possible view is that development ultimately aims to improve the lives of final 
beneficiaries, and that our actions should therefore stick as closely as possible to their needs. A 
third  understanding  of  ‗accountability‘  is  that  taxpayers  of  donor  countries  are  important 
stakeholders  of  this  policy,  and  have  a  legitimate  say  in  the  way  their  resources  are  used. 
Development institutions must therefore be accountable to citizens of donor countries and their 
elected representatives, and attentive to their priorities.  
The coexistence of these three systems of accountability is not a problem in itself, as long as all 
three of these legitimate constituencies of aid express similar needs and priorities and therefore 
expect similar actions from development agencies. In an ideal world, governments of recipient 
countries  would  voice  the  most  pressing  needs  expressed  by  their  populations,  and  donor 
institutions would be mandated by their constituencies to help them respond to these demands. In 
reality though, spontaneous convergence is rare. When these three preference functions diverge, 
accountability towards aid‘s final beneficiaries rarely gets the upper hand.  
The  current  aid  system  takes  the  concept  of  ‗aid  effectiveness‘  for  granted,  as  if  aid‘s 
effectiveness should be assessed according to one single easily identifiable set of objectives – the 
welfare  of  final  recipients.  Experience  shows  that  the  objective  function  of  a  bilateral  or 
multilateral  actor  is  in  fact  much  more  strongly  correlated  to  the  satisfaction  of  taxpayers, 
lobbies, institutional shareholders and other vested interests in the North who, although most 
often  professional  and  concerned,  are  often  very  remote  from  the  real  needs  of  final 
beneficiaries.  26 
 
Aid attribution is an example of the way this market failure can affect aid effectiveness: among 
the important functions of bilateral aid for donor countries is the ‗planting of the flag‘ – i.e. 
ensuring visibility for the donor country or its various ministers. This issue of visibility and 
attribution sometimes overrides important development concerns in the allocation of resources. It 
is no use deploring it, or accusing these preference functions of being illegitimate: they have 
their  own  logic  and  are  not,  in  themselves,  incompatible  with  aid‘s  effectiveness.  The  real 
question is how to ensure maximum convergence of the three preference functions, i.e. how to 
introduce final beneficiaries‘ preference functions into the political economy of aid. When a 
foreign minister visits a partner country, it is difficult for him to assess the quality of the aid 
delivered on the basis of national progress in health, socio-economic welfare or education. He 
will ask to visit a new clinic, factory or school funded by his country‘s development assistance, 
and he will want to communicate the amount of aid committed by his development agency in the 
country  and  its  rate  of  disbursement.  Few  aid  actors  would  agree  that  maximising  project 
visibility and development expenditures ought to be their key objective. Yet, in the absence of 
credible indicators of aid impact, development agencies are assessed according to an extremely 
weak proxy: their capacity to generate visible projects and disburse high volumes of funding 
quickly.  
This perverse incentive to spend the greatest possible amount of taxpayer money in the most 
visible way is matched by a second one, which also stems from the inadequacy of development 
indicators.  Because  donor  efforts  towards  international  solidarity  are  measured  in  terms  of 
‗Official  Development  Assistance‘,  bilateral  development  agencies  are  too  often  assessed 
according  to  their  capacity  to  ‗generate  ODA‘…  rather  than  addressing  partner  countries‘ 
priority needs. As a result, a state with important problems of criminality will have the greatest 
difficulty finding funds to build a much-needed prison – as the funding of penitentiaries cannot 
count  as  development  assistance  according  to  DAC  rules.  We  have  discussed  at  length  the 
weaknesses of the ODA figure. Suffice to say that despite important progress over the last few 
years, the paucity of measures of impact represents a major blind spot of global public policies. 
 
The evaluation gap syndrome 
The third market failure, which is alone responsible for a considerable chunk of aid incoherence, 
is the persisting evaluation gap
52.  
Development professionals often complain about the  seemingly irrational decisions taken by 
their political masters. Admittedly, these  political decisions  are responsible for many of the 
pendulum swings that are so detrimental to policy, and many of the white elephants that populate 
the landscape of international development aid. But can  decision-makers really be blamed for 
these  inconsiderate  choices?  Political  authorities  in  donor  countries  cannot  make  rational 
arbitrations on which strategies to favour  or where to allocate development aid  if they cannot 
base their decisions on authoritative research regarding what works and what doesn‘t, and what 
type of projects should be funded. There is today no existing mechanism that would give an 
assembly of decision-makers a synthetic and reliable vision of strategic options from which to 
choose. The resulting practice is that institutions, lobbies and think tanks with varying levels of 
influence, legitimacy and professionalism offer their opinions on what development strategies 
ought to be followed and what sectors are currently underfinanced by international aid. Only 
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when the bulk of these voices agree that something has gone wrong is the course corrected, such 
that precious time and resources are wasted.   
The  2007/2008  global  food  crisis  exemplified  this  dysfunction  of  the  aid  industry.  Aid  to 
agriculture plummeted in the 1980‘s and 1990‘s, as bilateral and multilateral donors alike shifted 
their attention and aid budgets away from agricultural development to focus on debt relief and 
the social sectors. The global volume of assistance to agriculture fell from US$ 6.2 billion to 
US$  2.3  billion  between  1980  and  2002
53  (Figure  8  shows this evolution for Sub -Saharan 
Africa). Since global aid flows increased by 65% during this same period,  the share of total 
development aid to agriculture fell from 17% of total ODA in 1982 to only 3.7% in 2002.
54 Only 
a  few  months  before  a  global  food  crisis  erupted,  the  World  Bank‘s  influential  World 
Development Report reminded the aid industry of the importance of agriculture for development. 
After a surge in the price of basic foodstuffs and a series of food riots in 2007 and 2008, billions 
of dollars of aid are now being pledged for boosting agriculture in the developing world. Could 
this sad episode of collective misjudgement have been avoided? Finding a suitable allocation of 
funds across sectors is always a delicate balance, to which there can be no ‗right answer‘. In an 
industry  where  allotment  choices  are  fully  decentralised,  its  actors  are  bound  to  repeat  this 
allocation mistake if they are not assisted by independent research and analysis on the resulting 
funding choices for the global public policy.    
 
 Figure 8, Aid to agriculture in Subsaharan Africa, 5-year moving average, 1999 prices 




The evaluation gap is  responsible for poor  aid quality in  another important  way.  In the aid 
industry  as  in  any  other,  some  actors  are  more  effective  than  others.  Yet  development 
stakeholders from donor or recipient countries have no way of establishing who is better than 
whom at doing what. Whereas international rankings exist to rate the quality of universities
56, too 
little is done in the way o f evaluating donor performances  based on the quality of the aid 
delivered
57. As a result, phoney NGOs or foundations roam in developing countries in the name 
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55 EICHER, C. (December 2003), ―Flashback: Fifty years  of donor aid to African agriculture,‖ Michigan State 
University. 
56 These rankings may justifiably be contested and certainly ought to be improved; however they exist, which is a 
merit in itself.  
57 An important step to fill this gap has been taken by the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie). Cf. 
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of development or humanitarian aid, burdening local administration for very poor development 
results. Some bilateral actors are accused of serving the commercial interests of their country at 
the expanse of the social and economic well-being of the host country. Yet no credible source of 
information is available to prove or disprove such claims – a situation that nurtures suspicion of 
development assistance as a whole.   
 
The capacity-building paradox  
A fourth market failure generates perverse incentives for donors. It is what we call the ‗capacity-
building paradox‘. The lack of institutional capacities lies at the heart of underdevelopment, as it 
is both a cause and a symptom of poverty. And yet the weaker state capacities, the more donors 
tend  to  be  massively  present  and  design  coordination  mechanisms…  that  require  high 
administrative capacities from the receiving state! The result is that donors spend much of their 
time  and  energy  ‗coordinating‘  without  solving  the  weakness  which  is  at  the  heart  of  the 
problem. The inability to tackle the capacity-building paradox is largely related to the pressure 
for  immediate  tangible  results  from  which  more  and  more  development  organisations  are 
suffering. The Paris Declaration is the first international agreement on aid to mention capacity-
building among its main objectives. However it can only rely on goodwill for its implementation: 
bilateral donors‘ preference functions are driven by rational choice, bounded by their capital and 
public opinion‘s preferences. 
When they work in a project mode, donors have few incentives to generate long-term capacity, 
as they risk losing these capacities to other projects and donors – at typical case of the tragedy of 
the commons described by Hardin
58. In a context where political premium for visible results and 
impacts keeps mounting, donor projects are too often driven by the quest for immediate solutions 
to  highly-visible  problems, to the detriment of the patient work of strengthening  the  local 
capacities  that  will  be  able  to  solve  these  problems  in  the  long -run.  The  international 
community‘s  efforts  in  the  reconstruction  of  Afghanistan  are  a  particularly  telling  example, 
where  specialized  donor-driven  agencies  or  project  implementation  units  are  charged  with 
delivering a given public good that weak public administrations do not have the capacity to 
deliver. This has a hidden cost, which takes the form of a serious blow to the legitimacy of the 
Afghan state
59 – whose side-effects are all too clear, but too seldom taken into account. Global 
public policies that address long-term stakes fall on the same side of the ‗problem-solving versus 
capacity-building‘  dilemma.  Take  climate  change:  pressure  for  visible  results  creates  an 
incentive for actors to report and communicate on the tons of carbon their projects saved for the 
world, rather than to invest in strengthening the domestic institutional capacities of developing 
countries to fight against climate change or adapt to it.  
The  problem  is  that  donors  are  not  rewarded  for  the  public  good  they  generate  when  they 
generate capacity, and pay no extra cost when they use existing capacities – such that the low-
hanging fruits with small long-term development results remain much more appetizing than the 
projects that generate longer-term, higher development-return. This leads us back to where we 
left global public policies in our previous paper: indicators matter! We are forced to recognize 
that there are no credible indicators that can give credit to effective capacity-building efforts: 
build a well you are a hero (few will notice if it is dry two years down the road); help structure a 
well-maintenance system in a desolate area and you will have the hardest time raising money!  
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Conventional wisdom holds that coordinated budget support is the way forward, as the ideal 
instrument to harmonise donor practices and improve government capacity. It is understood by 
many  as  a  convincing  response  to  the  coordination  troubles  that  gave  rise  to  the  Paris 
Declaration. Yet budget aid is no panacea either. While it can be an efficient way to disburse 
funds in countries with high capacities, these countries are precisely those that suffer least from 
donor proliferation and ill-coordination. On the other hand, in states with weakest capacities, the 
beneficiary cannot handle the large volumes of aid that it receives without deducting a high 
corruption or inefficiency toll. It may well be that the pressure to expand budget support despite 
the  weakness  of  local  financing  systems  ends  up  undermining  aid  efficiency  rather  than 
improving it. Herein lies the second face of the capacity-building paradox: as effective budget 
aid supposes the weak capacity issue resolved, the donor community is not responding to the 
institutional weakness that creates the need for coordination in the first place. Once again, the 
existing coordination mechanisms appear to be blind to the massive disparities in capacities in 
recipient sates. 
 
3. Engineering processes of hypercollective action 
  
Over the past decade, practitioners and academics have identified the growing chaos generated 
by the proliferation of actors of development assistance as a major source of inefficiency in aid 
delivery. As we have seen, the reaction has been to rush toward the field to build cooperation 
frameworks. Though useful and well inspired, these schemes have generally missed their goal: 
by  overlooking the faulty incentive structures of aid actors, the international community has 
ended putting all the eggs of the effectiveness issue in the basket of the Paris Declaration – an 
attempt to reduce the complexity of the aid architecture through coordination.  
Clearly, in spite of all its merits, the Paris Declaration does not provide solid enough ground on 
which to build the kind of hypercollective action that is required by 21
st century global public 
policies. Should the baby be thrown out with the bathwater? Not just yet: the improvements 
brought about by the Paris Declaration process are certainly welcome, and many lessons are still 
to be learned from this important experiment in collective policy-making. But it is high time for 
a new conceptual framework to emerge, one which will help shape dynamic processes of multi-
actor  convergence  that  are  more  compatible  with  the  political  economy  of  international 
cooperation initiatives as they are taking shape in these early years of the 21
st century. This will 
imply getting the philosophy right, and getting the processes right.  
  
3.1 Getting the philosophy right 
 
Facing complexity  
Let us come back to the concept of hypercollective action: hypercollective action is not just the 
product of the interaction between an increasing number and kind of actors in a given field of 
policy. More fundamentally, it is a new way of thinking, devising  and implementing public 
policy in a world of ‗evermore collective action‘.  
We have seen that what is at stake is not so much the proliferation of actors (a trend that is here 
to stay), but rather the effective management of this proliferation in a way that addresses the 
shortcomings of the political economy of international cooperation. Let us then consider how the 30 
 
evolution  from  collective  to  hypercollective  action  impacts  the  governance  of  the  emerging 
global policy, and what role this leaves to the historical actors of international relations – good 
old nation states.  
Conventional collective action in international relations typically involves the coordination of a 
limited number of relatively homogeneous actors, gathered in the name of their decision-making 
power to solve a given problem. In addition to the framework of international law, formal (IMF) 
or informal (G8, now G20) international regimes were instituted in the 20
th century to allow 
important stakeholders of a given issue to meet, discuss and eventually reach common decisions. 
What  we are seeing with the explosion of the number and kind  of actors  that compose the 
embryonic global public policy is the extreme complexification of the processes of international 
cooperation  and  decision-making:  as  we  have  seen,  hypercollective  action  concerns  a  much 
larger number of more heterogeneous actors, involved (rather than invited) in the discussion 
because they count among the policy‘s multiple ‗stakeholders‘
60. Looking at recent successes in 
international mobilization, one sees that the collective action of this constellation of actors has 
tended  to  structure  itself  through  forums  (such  as  the  ‗World  Social  Forum‘  or  the  ‗World 
Economic Forum‘), partnerships (‗The Global Compact‘), platforms (‗Save Darfur coalition‘, 
Interaction, CONCORD or Eurodad), networks (Global Development Network, Development 
Gateway)  and  epistemic  communities  (materialized  by  thematic  journals  and  think  tanks). 
Whether formal or informal, these regimes have themselves become ‗hypercollective‘. In a way, 
the new generation of international policymaking is structured like a gigantic ‗wiki- platform
 61‘, 
in which very different actors plug their concepts, strategies, instruments, and financial inputs. 
No single actor of the community is formally responsible for the final output – global public 
policies – whose objectives and instruments are in perpetual redefinition. As with any wiki, there 
is no fixed architecture: actors work on a perpetual ‗beta‘ version.    
Table 2, International regimes 2.0 
   Late 20
th century   Early 2000’s 
Worldwide 
web 
Web 1.0  Web 2.0 
 1.  Architecture  of  information  through  single 
editing: website as content delivered by a webmaster 
to internet users 
 1.  Architecture  of  participation  through  open  editing: 
website as an interactive platform with real-time input from 
internet users 
 2.  Static  architecture  and  content  between  two 
updates 
 
 2. Perpetual ‗beta‘ version: the architecture and content are 
continuously  shaped  through  an  ongoing  process  of 
collaboration  that  constantly  changes  the  Web  site 
landscape  
 3.  Passive  community  that  absorbs  available 
information – and possibly reacts by contacting the 
webmaster through a bilateral relationship 
 3. Active wiki communities and social networks that share 
information,  knowledge  and  opinions  in  a  multilateral 
relationship 
 4. The owner of the website finances its activities   4. All  members of the  network are invited  to donate to 
finance its upkeep 
 5. Content is typically protected by copyright   5. Open source software and ‗creative commons‘ licenses 
are typically used, which favours reproduction of content 
Inter-
national 
International regimes  International regimes 2.0 
 1.  International  policies  are  designed  by  states.   1.  International policies are  shaped and delivered by all 
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Non-state actors can react to the policy choices  stakeholders (states, NGOs, foundations, local authorities, 
businesses,  epistemic  communities,  bilateral  and 
multilateral authorities…) in various forums 
 2. The architecture and policy content of collective 
action is stable from one official summit to the next  
 2.  The  architecture  of  collaboration  is  perpetually 
redefined by ad hoc coalitions of actors gathering around 
given topics  
 3. The negotiators of international policies has only 
slow and formal collaboration processes 
 3.  The  designers  of  global  public  policies  exchange 
information, knowledge and opinions in real time 
 4. States finance the bulk of cooperation efforts   4. All stakholders bring inputs into the policy 
 5.  Each  organisation  designs  its  own  learning 
processes  (evaluations,  training)  to  improve  its 
effectiveness  
 5. Actors enter into collaborative learning processes  
 
One of the benefits of these new collaborative processes of international policymaking is that, 
although hypercollective motion necessitates a critical mass of actors progressing in the same 
direction,  it  does  not  require  that  every  single  actor  concerned  follows  suit.  Unlike  some 
international negotiations that need unanimous backing to progress, it is much more efficient to 
spend time and effort ensuring that the median player is comfortable with the direction or that the 
front-runners are exploring the right innovative paths than convincing the last naysayers that they 
should join the movement.  
On the other hand, it seems utopian to hope to plan or coordinate the action of this polycentric 
group of actors: in fact independence from political authority is a guiding principle for many 
actors of global public policies. As Owen Barder puts it for the field of development assistance, 
―we are reaching the limits of what can be achieved by better planning to improve aid‖
62. There 
is no future in planning as a way to improve aid, or indeed in the delivery of any global service 
or policy characterized by hypercollective action. What ought to be possible, however, is to 
provide a framework to orient the direction of its atomized group of players, one that will help 
make their trajectories converge in a more focused flow. This is what Nehmat Shafik advocates 
in a blog post entitled ‗From Architecture to Networks: Aid in a World of Variable Geometry‘
63. 
Pierre  Jacquet  argues  that  efficient  international  cooperation  could  be  structured  though  a 
‗network of overlapping networks‘, and holds that each of these networks may develop its own 
principles of collective action provided there is mutual recognition between networks
64.  
To follow the wiki met aphore, improving the coherence of ‗global policies 2.0‘ will require 
designing  the  most  efficient  mechanisms  to  regulate  this  ‗architecture  of  participation‘. 
Depending on the characteristics of the public policy, its players and objectives, this may require 
drawing  more  extensively  on  market-based,  networks-based  or  more  traditional  rule-based 
cooperation models.  
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Shaping complexity 
Where  does  this  leave  the  historic  actors  of  international  collective  action?  Globalization 
enthusiasts who announced the dissolution of the nation state for the turn of the century are in for 
a big surprise: the era of global public policies and hypercollective action will not be that of 
states‘ evanescence, quite the contrary. In fact, the series of global crises of the early 21
st century 
have seen the comeback of states as actors of international relations. The 9/11 attacks has led 
several  countries  to  tighten  border  security,  in  some  cases  constraining  international  travel 
considerably. The 2007 and 2008 food crisis has led some states to reduce or stop their food 
exports  for  the  sake  of  national  food  security.  In  their  fight  against  the  H1N1  pandemic, 
governments have ordered vaccines for their own populations, with little regard to the capacity 
of  international  pharmaceutical  companies  to  deliver  them  –  or,  for  that  matter  for  poorer 
countries  to  afford  them.  Finally,  the  financial  crisis  has  led  states  to  bail  out  banks  by 
nationalising what they considered as key national assets. Clearly political authority remains in 
high demand, and continues to lie essentially with national governments.  
How does this recent trend of state resurgence fit with that of the increasing weight of non-state 
actors  on  the  international  scene?  Both  of  these  tendencies  are  compatible  with  –  in  fact, 
constitutive of – hypercollective action. It is a mistake to think the expansion of non-state actors 
and  the  continued  presence  of  states  in  international  relations  as  antagonistic.  As  they  will 
continue to coexist in the management of international policy, both state and non-state actors will 
need to find new ways of interacting in the definition of public goods and in the structures to 
deliver them.  
  
Complexity is built into the fabric of global public policies
65. This complexity is neither ‗good‘ 
nor ‗bad‘; it is an inescapable fact of early 21
st century international relations – one that is likely 
to stay, as the Copenhagen negotiations have shown. What is urgently needed is to make sense of 
this complexity. And, because the forces that engender it (proliferation, fragmentation…) can 
help or handicap the delivery of efficient international services where they are needed,  it is 
fundamental that this complexity be shaped politically so as to minimize the risk of chaos it 
generates  while  preserving  its  fruitful  diversity.  Rather  than  attempting  to  reduce  or  even 
manage this complexity as the Paris Declaration has attempted to do in the field of aid, what is 
needed is to steer it towards greater effectiveness.   
Public authorities have a fundamental role to play in steering this complexity in a way that 
provides the best possible fit between the supply of global public policies and the demand for 
‗global public services‘ (i.e. efforts to guarantee a stable climate, to ensure a reasonably secure 
international and local environment, to preserve humanity from the spread of global pandemics, 
etc.).  The  challenge  of  hypercollective  action  and  the  stakes  linked  to  its  success  will  push 
national and regional political authorities to set their violins aside to reposition themselves as the 
conductors of a grand polyphonic symphony. As trustees of the public good, their collective task 
is to structure global hypercollective action into relevant, coherent and effective global public 
policies to deal with the most crucial threats to global prosperity.   
What are the instruments available to steer the coalition of actors of global public policies? As 
we have seen, different modes of collaboration coexist, and can be drawn upon to make actors‘ 
expectations  converge.  We  have  identified  five:  rules,  systems  of  incentives,  discourses, 
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networks and norms or standards. Because each of these modes of collaboration affects different 
actors differently, none in itself is any longer sufficient to generate effective collective action. 
Successes  of  international  cooperation  such  as  the  mobilization  in  favour  of  antiretroviral 
treatment
66  show  that  when  they  are  effectively  combined,  they  can  produce  extremely 
convincing results.  Each of them can be thought of as a thread . The challenge ahead lies in 
knitting each of these threads so as to generate the fabric of effective hypercollective action.  
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Beyond the promising intuition that international collective action will increasingly take the form 
of networks of actors, and that it will necessarily draw from various modes of collaboration, the 
concrete way to move from ill-fated attempts at ‗harmonization‘ to new paradigms of regulation 
largely remain to be invented – a daunting task, on which this last section of the paper proposes 
to venture a few preliminary suggestions.  
 
  3.2 Addressing specific gaps in the market of global public policies  
After a long trip in the austere backrooms of global public policies, it is now time to embark on a 
little institutional architecture exercise, and to put forward a few very concrete propositions on 
what structures and processes of hypercollective action could look like.   
As we have seen, the Paris Declaration has so far been the most important effort to harness the 
‗hypercollective‘ in the development aid ecosystem. Yet it stems from an imperfect analysis of 
the political economy of this burgeoning global public policy. It focuses on local issues (thus 
losing sight of upstream incoherence), it assumes that donors are driven by a single preference 
function, it sees aid recipients as a homogeneous whole, and it relies excessively on two modes 
of collaboration (rules and standards) to the detriment of the three others. Improving actors‘ 
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performances in the delivery of their share of the collective good will imply building a more 
comprehensive framework of cooperation for the provision of global public services – one which 
builds on the five threads of hypercollective action. The last section offers a few suggestions on 
how to take a few steps in this direction. It looks at whether fresh ideas could emerge from 
placing additional emphasis on the ‗incentives‘ and ‗discourses‘ that drive the actors of global 
public  policies,  as  well  as  improving  the  networks  through  which  they  collaborate  and  the 
standards  around  which  they  make  their  actions  converge.  It  suggests  a  new  ambition  for 
multilateral organizations – one which would turn them into the agents of hypercollective action.  
 
Informing the policy 
We  have  shown  how  incoherent  policy  choices  could  originate  from  diverging  preference 
functions of the various constituencies of aid. Making the supply of aid more responsive to the 
demand  side‘s  needs,  we  argued,  implies  incorporating  as  much  as  possible  of  final 
beneficiaries‘ priorities in the preference functions of donor constituencies in the North (and in 
those of recipient state authorities). Though this will remain a challenging issue in the world of 
hypercollective action, reducing asymmetries of information in the aid market is a fundamental 
step to bridge the awareness, consent and accountability gaps. 
 
  Public information to shareholders 
The first corollary of this statement is that public information is no trivial task, but one of the 
important means to improve the effectiveness of global public policies. Why is public money 
spent  on  biodiversity  protection,  conflict  management,  poverty  reduction  or  climate  change 
mitigation  projects  on  the  other  side  of  the  globe,  when  donor  countries  are  themselves 
confronted  with  poverty,  insecurity  and  environmental  degradation?  Actors  of  international 
cooperation tend to forget that the answers to such questions are not self-evident: the evolving 
rationale for North/South collaboration needs to be explained
70. Spontaneous awareness of these 
needs is typically very low: the stakes of the global public policies are complex, the projects they 
fund often thousands of miles away from the taxpayer, and their impacts mea surable years after 
the initial decision to finance a given operation has been taken.  
Transparent and accessible public information is the price to pay for the kind of support  that is 
required for  a sustained  public  effort  in favour of global public goods .  Taxpayers are the 
shareholders of these policies; without their consent, the public resources that irrigate bilateral, 
multilateral, but also NGO and philanthropic efforts will quickly dry up.  As shareholders, they 
need to be convinced that the right all ocation choices are being made.   This is what efforts 
towards public accountability are about.  With a few remarkable exceptions, c ommunication 
efforts towards the public opinion of OECD countries to explain the rationale for international 
cooperation have  been limited. A survey  undertaken in Europe  shows that the countries that 
dedicate most resources to development aid are also those who communicate most about it.  Do 
governments communicate on international solidarity because they do comparatively well in 
terms of public generosity, or do they do better than others because they communicate about this 
specific policy? The causality probably runs both ways. The remarkable coherence of Sweden‘s 
development aid policy, for instance, and the overall strategic alignment of Swedish government 
and civil society, anyway suggests that a virtuous circle can be made to exist.  
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  Voice of consumers 
The battle for better information and accountability also implies increasing the direct feedback 
from beneficiaries, i.e. fixing what Owen Barder calls the ‗broken feedback loop‘
71. Though 
many  development  programs  are  assessed  by  development  agencies  through  thorough 
investigations,  beneficiaries  (civil  society,  governments  and  final  beneficiaries)  are  seldom 
consulted in a serious way. In most cases, they cannot assess and challenge the relevance and 
quality  of  the  programmes  designed  by  the  aid  agencies.  Providing  professional  360° 
assessments  and  ratings  of  individual  agencies,  foundations  and  NGOs  as  well  as  country 
programmes of each donor, and giving them wide publicity especially in donor countries should 
help not only improve the quality of each programme, but also provide better indications on the 
real demands of the beneficiaries. This should progressively help align private and public donors 
on the real priorities for the country by bringing better information on local expectations to the 
policy‘s constituents in donor countries.   
If it is to improve the coherence of aid choices, such a vast information effort on the foundations 
for global public policies will need to give voice to civil societies of developing nations, as they 
are often the best advocates of their cause and the best judges of aid‘s ultimate effectiveness. 
This battle for the general public‘s awareness cannot be carried out by states alone: it requires a 
collective  effort  by  coalitions  of  NGOs,  think  tanks,  bilateral  and  multilateral  institutions 
philanthropic actors and celebrities such as the ones that mobilised in favour of the populations 
of  Darfur,  the  victims  of  the  Haiti  Earthquake  or  the  democratization  of  ARV  treatments. 
Collective communication efforts not only increase the level of information and public support 
for the policy, but it also creates alignment: indeed, the need to create public discourses forces 
NGOs and state authorities to discuss on the substance of the discourse.    
  
  Indicators for stakeholders 
Finally, reducing asymmetries of information calls for developing robust performance indicators, 
more  strongly  correlated  to  global  public  policies‘  ultimate  goals.  Today,  these  concrete 
assessments of donor assistance results in health, education or environmental protection are rare. 
It should come as no surprise that aid remains hostage to second-order priorities, such as project 
visibility or meaningless technocratic measures of national generosity. What the policy needs, 
therefore, are indicators of impact that would allow its different stakeholders to assess aid quality 
and effectiveness according to its proclaimed objectives:  effective contributions to economic 
growth, the preservation of global public goods, or poverty reduction. What we aim to achieve is 
what we ought to be measuring! Although rigorous indicators of results are notoriously difficult 
to achieve, not least because of the methodological difficulty in attributing success, they are the 
key to sustained public support for global public policies. As such, they ought to be one of the 
areas of concentration of collaboration efforts between actors of the field. We will come back to 
ways in which this could be done.  
To sum up, one of the important ways to avoid incoherent funding choices is to contribute to the 
convergence of stakeholder preferences through: 1) communicating much more actively on the 
ultimate  objectives  of  the  policy  to  domestic  constituencies;  2)  giving  voice  to  final 
beneficiaries; and 3) building proper indicators of aid‘s contributions to its ultimate goals.  
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‘IPCCs’ for development aid and other global policies 
Despite recent accusations of partiality, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
proved  remarkably  effective  over  the  last  decades  in  making  science,  public  awareness  and 
policy  converge  toward  concrete  actions.  This  intergovernmental  body  was  established  to 
provide decision-makers and the general public with an objective source of information about 
climate change and its  threats.  Its  reports, which are  neutral  with  respect  to  policy, analyse 
projected impacts and outline options for adaptation and mitigation. They serve as the main 
reference for the international negotiations on climate change mitigation, and provide invaluable 
information to the media.  
The UN could gather a community of highly respected scientists, academics and professionals, 
under the independent chairmanship of a ‗wise man/woman‘, with the objective of providing 
authoritative knowledge and information on global public concerns and their evolution. It would 
give them the mandate to provide regular reviews on the needs for global collective services and 
current policy choices. While raising the profile of the international cooperation, this would help 
combat sectarian ideologies and petty interests, cast light on difficult policy choices, and provide 
a clear overview on which decision-makers could base their judgement. It would survey existing 
practices of global public policies (global funding allocations, strategies and instruments) and 
suggest  possible arbitration  decisions,  so  as  to limit the effect  that we referred to  earlier as 
‗trendy aid‘.  
Decision-making is an inherently political function, and should remain so. But outlining possible 
policy options and instruments available to deal with a given ill, their likely costs and their 
expected impacts does not need to be. Informing and depoliticizing this crucial step of policy-
making  would  help  rationalise  decisions  that  are  presently  taken  according  to  political 
authorities‘ best judgement – and the capacity of lobbies to plead for their cause. Although this 
public information in itself would not stop poor or even irrational allocation decisions, it would 
increase the accountability of political authorities for their choices. 
 
Incentivizing the policy 
At this point, some readers will be asking what can possibly make the authors think that the 
various  actors  of  global  public  policies  would  spontaneously  accept  to  move  towards 
constraining forms of collaboration for the sake of collective efficiency.  
And justly so: in the absence of any overarching authority in the aid market, awareness of the 
costs of proliferation, fragmentation and ill-coordination will not by itself lead those responsible 
for these ills to change their practices. For the same reason that some actors of development aid 
can simultaneously agree with the principles of the Paris Declaration and resent applying them to 
their own work in practice, most institutions will resist moves to cooperate in the absence of 
credible incentives. As economists put it, suboptimal equilibriums can be extremely stable when 
those who need to act to improve the situation do not bear the bulk of its costs, and would benefit 
marginally from the gains. Because it would be illusory to dream of piloting every actor in any 
centralized way, what is needed is to drive the drivers of change. As in any collective action 
problem, part of the solution therefore lies in developing the right system of incentives – sticks 
and carrots for actors to make their practices converge.    
  Sticks… 
Negative  incentives  would  need  to  punish  ill-performing  actors  of  international  cooperation 
(assessed according to the common performance standards to which we will turn) and those 37 
 
actors who refuse to enter in collaborative working modes (i.e. the free riders of cooperation 
efforts). In the absence of a strong and legitimate overarching authority, it is difficult to envisage 
mechanisms to discipline free-riders and ill-performers of the development aid, humanitarian 
relief and global public goods industries other than of a reputational nature. Yet credible finger-
pointing exercises can be extremely effective in a business where reputation is a key element of 
success – as the considerable impacts of certain media, NGO and think-tank reports have shown 
in the past
72.  
Some  existing  instruments,  such  as  the  OECD  DAC‘s  peer  reviews,  the  Center  for  Global 
Development‘s ‗commitment to development index‘ or the recent ‗International Initiative for 
Impact Evaluation‘ have this naming and shaming dimension. What the field is missing however 
are independent mechanisms to evaluate the impacts of international aid on a given country or 
sector. How effective are the donor community‘s combined efforts in Cambodia or the DRC? 
What can be improved in the international efforts for the protection of biodiversity? Such cross-
donor evaluation exercises would help point out in each country or sector which donors are 
playing  the  collective  action  game  constructively,  and  which  are  free  riding  on  others‘ 
collaborative efforts. They would also help fight the marginal player syndrome by naming-and-
shaming donors that show poor performance according to standard metrics for success – rather 
than those who do not stick to the trendy idea of the day. This again underlines the need for a 
credible  evaluation  function  at  the  international  level,  capable  of  shaming  actors  into 
collaborative attitudes.   
Some specific sectors of the global public policy are equipping themselves with such cross-donor 
evaluation tools. The field of microfinance lived through a surge of actors and funding in the 
mid-2000‘s. The dramatic rise in funders posed a risk to the quality of the projects, such that a 
group of donors decided to set up an evaluation process, and to entrust an independent policy and 
research  centre with  the mission to  carry  it out.  In addition  to  its  work on quantifying  and 
analyzing  global funding flows in the field of microfinance, CGAP
73 now counts among its 
missions to improve the transparency around the performance of various funders. Its SmartAid 
for Mircofinance Index
74 measures how well donors are set up to support microfinance, outlining 
strengths and areas of improvements. It draws on the good practice guidelines established over 
time with the Centre‘s different members, and a body of knowledge developed through peer 
reviews, country reviews and portfolio reviews. Rather than going down the route of the polite 
DAC peer-review process, each audited donor is given a score, which reflects its performance on 
five  areas  agreed  by  all  funders  as  critical  for  effective  microfinance:  strategic  clarity, 
accountability for results, knowledge management and appropriate instruments. Tens of donors 
are audited every year, including some of the field‘s largest actors – which is likely to push other 
microfinance actors to be audited and awarded a mark.   
The results so far are inspiring. The CGAP review process has convinced some actors to opt out 
of microcredit, and provided others with incentives for changing their ways of doing business. 
Given the success of the CGAP experience in the field of microfinance,  other global public 
policies could equip themselves to assess the quality of outputs delivered by different types of 
actors along similar principles of organisation. Their reunion in a network could eventually take 
the form of a more comprehensive evaluation platform of global public policies.  
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An evaluation platform for global public policies 
An independent evaluation platform could be set up to review in a structured, transparent and 
open manner global public policy performance at the geographic (country by country), thematic 
(policy by policy) and actor (donor by donor) level. It would draw on the capacities of many 
universities  and  think  tanks,  to  provide  the  international  community  with  independent 
evaluations.   
Its  objective  would  be  to  evaluate  more  systematically  the  overall  impact  of  international 
cooperation  initiatives  in  given  countries  and  sectors.  It  would  thus  name-and-shame  ill-
performing actors of global public policies and free riders of cooperation efforts – be they states, 
transnational companies, multilateral organisations, NGOs or philanthropic foundations. In doing 
so, it would need to look beyond the strict perimeter of development assistance, and assess the 
broader coherence of these different actors‘ strategic choices. The power of such an instrument is 
that it does not require consensus from all parties in order to be effective: a given player may 
object  to  the  legitimacy  of  the  evaluation,  but  nevertheless  resent  being  stigmatized  if  a 
sufficiently large amount of its peers give credit to the evaluation process.  If the evaluating 
authority has sufficient credence, the very risk of being stigmatized would progressively lead 
actors to opt out of sectors or countries where they have little added-value and progressively 
enter into accepted convergence mechanisms.  
There is no time to stay polite. The stakes of global ills are too high for endless diplomacy: the 
international  community is  in  a dire need of  a credible independent  evaluation  platform  for 
global public policies.     
  
  … and carrots 
Positive incentives would also need to entice actors of international cooperation in spending time 
and energy looking for compatible strategies or common solutions to global problems.  
In fact, European development aid has recently gone down this road, in a pragmatic and flexible 
approach to donor coordination. Several instruments have been set up over the last  years to 
provide  incentives  for  innovative  collaboration  and  co-financing  between  European  donor 
agencies
75. The European Commission has a special role   in these instruments: rather than 
implementing the projects as any other donor, it provides the framework through which multi -
actor convergence happens, and an important financial incentive for donors to team -up to 
provide a collaborative solution to local development problems. It is worth taking a moment to 
describe how one of these instruments works.  
The  European  Union‘s  Strategy  for  Africa,  published  in  2005,  set  the  broad  objective  of 
‗interconnecting‘ Africa in terms of transport, water, energy and telecommunications. To this 
end, in 2006 the EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure was endowed with a Trust Fund to 
speed up regional projects. The Infrastructure Trust Fund, managed by the European Investment 
Bank  (EIB),  is  funded  jointly  by  member  states,  bilateral  agencies  and  the  European 
Commission. It subsidizes the financing of infrastructure projects – mostly those included on the 
list of the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD, 2001). Subsidies reduce interest 
rates on loans from  donors who co-finance the projects.  The Commission,  which chairs the 
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Fund‘s executive committee, promotes projects considered as priorities by the beneficiaries – 
thus  ensuring  the  recipient  country‘s  ownership.  The  beneficiary  is  involved  in  project 
preparation from the design stage through to the financing proposal, and gives its assent to the 
terms  and  conditions  of  the  loan.  The  general  rule  is  to  use  national  systems  for  project 
implementation, rather than donor procedures. If the local rules of procurement do not provide 
sufficient guarantees, those of the consortium‘s ‗lead donor‘ apply.  
One of the original elements of this fund is that it encourages co-financing: once projects are 
identified with partners in the South, they are discussed by European donors and put forward as 
loan applications. Loan applications are forwarded by a designated ‗lead donor‘ to the Fund‘s 
executive committee. Once the loans are approved, the Commission disburses a subsidy to the 
lead donor, in charge of implementing the program. Co-financing under the delegated authority 
of lead donors constitutes a form of delegation of funds from the members of the trust fund to the 
lead donor. This collaborative formula has led to policy dialogue among the group of donors, and 
a gradual convergence of standards. The Commission‘s financing has brought incentives  for 
bilateral European actors to collaborate – but left them free to decide whom they wished to 
partner with, and how they wished to organise their partnership. This has contributed to the 
mutual recognition of procedures by AFD, the EIB and KfW, and to the harmonisation of the 
criteria for evaluating loan applications.    
Such innovative forms of collaboration between bilateral and multilateral actors of international 
policies nuance the traditional divide between national and international institutions. It creates a 
new stage of collective action. What are the ingredients working behind this innovative model of 
‗plurilateral action‘? First, as in poker, every actor needs to contribute financially to the common 
pool in the form of an ‗entry ticket‘ (which could be made to vary according to institutions‘ 
capacity to pay, so as to include actors of different financial capacities). Being part of a club has 
a  cost.  Second,  considerable  additional  funding  is  provided  in  the  form  of  a  ‗top-up‘  by  a 
multilateral institution (in this case, the European Commission), which gains considerable weight 
in the allocation decision. Thirdly, a board composed of the different stakeholders decides in a 
collegial fashion on the objectives pursued and the conditions for eligibility (which, in this case, 
includes effective alignement on donor country strategy). Fourthly, a premium is given to multi-
actor projects, so as to encourage ‗learning by doing‘ by its members and promote economies of 
scale.  
This scheme of inter-donor cooperation provides a model of pragmatic hypercollective action. 
Replicating it would call for an important paradigmatic shift for multilateral institutions. Indeed 
today, multilateral institutions involved in international assistance and endowed with operational 
budgets (such as the World Bank, the European Commission or the UNDP) often operate as if 
they  were  ‗n+1  donors‘:  they  devise,  finance  and  implement  projects  and  programs  in  the 
countries they assist in much they same way as other actors of the field do. The paradox is that in 
host  countries  where  donors  abound  and  aid  absorption  capacity  is  scarce,  they  are  in 
competition  with  other  actors  of  international  assistance  to  finance  health,  microfinance, 
education or environment programs (including with the bilateral agencies of countries who sit on 
their boards!).   
Bilateral and multilateral organisations can clearly do better than form the loose grouping of 
competing institutions that they currently form. This can be seen as a fantastic waste of potential 
considering the huge added value of multilateral  actors, compared to  the multitude of other 
actors present in the field of global policies. What is multilateral organisations‘ built-in added 
value?  Reaching  threshold  effects  by  pooling  large  volumes  of  resources;  ‗industrialising‘ 
projects through the replication of pilot schemes; setting international standards (such as those 40 
 
that  serve  as  the  backbone  of  the  Clean  Development  Mechanism  for  instance);  gathering 
information and knowledge; providing multi-actor forums and setting up mechanisms through 
which other sets of actors can collaborate…  
In a well-run world of global public policy, the main role of multilateral organisations should be 
to organise and finance collective action between the other players of global public policies. This 
would give all its sense to the pooling of national resources. The financing of a bilateral actor by 
a multilateral institution is sometimes perceived as a way to ‗renationalise‘ or ‗contract out‘ 
global public policy. But this is a narrow and corporatist way of envisaging multilateral action – 
as if multilateral institutions had to defend ‗their‘ funding and prerogatives.  
Turning multilateral organisations into agents of hypercollective action will require that they 
perceive their role as platforms for multi-actor cooperation. As such, they could be the organisers 
and rewarders of cooperation, and the vectors of harmonisation between the field‘s different 
actors. This would allow them to focus on what they do best: setting the stage for effective 
hypercollective  action.  We  understand  that  this  would  be  a  major  change  in  their  practices. 
Consider the response to the Haiti earthquake: instead of setting up a trust fund whose projects 
would be implemented by their teams, the World Bank and UNDP could use the trust fund‘s 
board to define a common policy framework to which all actors wishing to benefit from trust 
funding  (NGOs,  bilateral  organisations  or  foundations)  would  adhere.  Instead  of  being 
implementation  agents,  these  multilateral  organizations  would  become  ‗rewarding‘  and 
‗incintivizing‘ agents, which could considerably improve the coherence and thus the efficiency 
of the overall reconstruction effort.  
 
‘Top-up schemes’ to deliver assistance through multi-actor coalitions 
One  of  the  ways  in  which  convergence  can  be  encouraged  is  by  giving  multilaterals 
responsibility of ‗top-up schemes‘, explicitly designed to reward collaborative work between 
different actors of global public polices. The EU‘s Infrastructure Trust Fund for Africa described 
earlier could serve as a model for this type of multi-stakeholder collective action. Such schemes 
could  be  stepped-up  considerably,  and  adapted  to  different  contexts  to  best  fit  the  needs 
expressed by the intended beneficiaries.  
They should first be developed in fragile and post-conflict states, where donor coherence is most 
crucial, absorption capacities most problematic and financing needs most dire
76. However such 
‗top-up schemes‘ could serve in other contexts, and inspire the practice of vertical funds. In this 
respect, the climate negotiations offer a wonderful opportunity to advance in the right direction. 
At the time this paper is written, the world is due to launch a new climate change fund. Rather 
than building yet another standard vertical fund for environmental protection, this global fund 
could be designed along the lines of a ‗top-up fund‘ with the triple objective of 1) starting from 
local demand rather than global supply; 2) using a diversified pool of financial and technical 
instruments; 3) and encouraging locally-anchored and multi-actor efforts.  
Coalitions of actors already working on these issues (NGOs, foundations, bilateral development 
agencies…) could apply for complementary funding on top of existing programmes. Projects 
would only be eligible for ‗top-up funding‘ if their sponsors: 1) are in line with the trust fund‘s 
strategy (i.e., fit to the geographic and thematic priorities outlined by its statutes); 2) submit the 
project  as  part  of  coalition;  3)  define  agreed  outputs  of  the  project  according  to  standard 
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measures  of  output;  and  4)  agree  for  the  project  to  be  audited  by  the  evaluation  platform 
mentioned above.   
 
Generating common norms, standards and objectives 
The global financial crisis has shown that the proliferation of actors and instruments in under-
regulated markets can be a factor of fragility for the system as a whole. But is proliferation or ill-
regulation the problem? What makes a market efficient is not the reduction in the number of its 
actors,  or even the  coordination  of their strategies.  On the contrary,  efficient  markets  thrive 
because companies have different strategies.  If it isn‘t ‗harmonisation‘ or ‗integration‘, what 
makes a market efficient?  
What ultimately counts is the existence of an established framework within which actors can 
safely compete and innovate. On top of asymmetries of information and insufficient incentives to 
cooperate, the market for aid as it stands suffers from the weakness of its norms and standards, 
and the absence of a general sense of direction. A more explicit normative framework for the 
emerging global public policies could provide the canvas in which organizations‘ practices will 
gradually converge. By making every actor‘s efforts compatible, it would allow for their impacts 
to add up. Two sets of norms will need to be developed in the years to come.  
The first are common ‗accounting‘ standards, so that all aid actors develop compatible languages 
of inputs and results. We have seen that global public policies have inadequate measures of 
policy  inputs,  outputs  and  impacts
77. The consequence is that it is difficult to compare the 
respective efforts made by donors , and to evaluate the efficiency of their action.  Developing 
common benchmarks of effort and metrics of success is one of the keys to improving aid 
effectiveness.  
 
An international accounting standards board  
We have seen that the role of multilateral organisations should evolve so as to allow them to 
concentrate on what other actors cannot do. Beyond their twin role as financers of cooperation 
and rewarders of convergence mentioned above, they should push their advantage as poles of 
experience-sharing and standard-setting for all actors of global public policies. By opening to the 
field‘s more recent actors (emerging donors, NGOs, foundations, etc.), multilateral organisations 
can be the place where aid actors negotiate common norms and standards.  
This  has  already  been  done:  through  patient  work  involving  many  different  actors  of 
humanitarian aid, the Sphere Project has devised a series of internationally-recognized standards 
for the delivery of humanitarian aid
78. The OECD DAC, enriched with representatives from the 
whole range of institutions active in global public policies, could serve as the focal point for the 
emergence of alternative measures of inputs and impact  of international cooperation – i.e. serve 
as the ‗International Accounting Standards Board‘ of global policies.  
The new Board could begin this process by unbundling ‗ODA‘, i.e. looking into complementary 
ways of measuring financial inputs into the delivery of essential services, the promotion of given 
global public goods or economic convergence. It could, for example, investigate a measure based 
on budget costs, and one on overall financial volumes dedicated to these objectives.  
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Measuring inputs, however, will not suffice; it should also investigate ways of measuring the 
different outputs of global public policies. The first step would be to share practices regarding 
the elaboration of results-based indicators, such as what is being done to achieve compatible 
measures of the reduction of CO2 emissions. As common methods are found to measure the tons 
of carbon emissions reduced, common methods  could be devised to  evaluate the number of 
schoolchildren sent to school, or the improvement in the quality of the schooling they receive. 
Many other international standards could be produced and progressively refined through such a 
project, to measure policy impacts in the domains of health, food security, etc.   
Another  important  result  these  international  measurement  tools  should  try  to  assess  is 
international  contributions  to  local  capacity-building.  This  would  facilitate  giving  credit  to 
crucial capacity-building efforts that are today the work of a few enlightened institutions. The 
improvement in the quality of institutions and governance will need to be put at the forefront of 
policy output performance indicators. This is in no way easy, but agreeing on a solid capacity 
and institutional capacity index is now within reach.  
The second set of common standards that is urgently needed is a set of agreed objectives, so as to 
ensure that all actors of global public policies pull in the same direction.  
The aid industry has long suffered from confusion between goals and instruments: while the 
objective  of  greater  effectiveness  implies  that  all  actors  of  global  public  policies  should  be 
working towards common goals, it makes little sense to harmonize the strategies and instruments 
they deploy to reach them. Yet development orthodoxies have tended to harmonize strategies 
while changing over time the objectives of what they are expected to achieve. On the contrary, 
what the international community needs is a broad set of common goals towards which all actors 
deploy their energy. In order to be effective, these need to be compatible with development‘s 
timeline, and therefore remain stable for longer than a decade. The MDG framework, provided it 
is understood as outlining common objectives of end-results rather than mere input allocation 
grids
79, can provide the basis for such agreement on global public policies‘ goals. The reflections 
on the MDGs post-2015 would provide a good occasion to review these objectives and clarify 
their meaning. We shall come back to this point in a following paper.    
Naturally, these sets of common norms and standards will not arise spontaneously. Luckily, the 
20
th century has bequeathed a dense network of institutions in charge  of global governance, 
whose very objective is to provide a framework for common directions to be discussed, global 
norms and standards to be set and regulatory bodies to be established. As we have argued, these 
institutions of global governance are where this patient process of multi-actor discussion and 
norm-setting ought to take place.  
 
A Davos summit for global public policies 
Progress on the coherence of international cooperation initiatives will depend on the progress of 
global governance. Although much remains to be done to consolidate its role, the birth of the 
G20 is  no doubt  an important  step forward  in  adapting  global  governance processes to  21
st 
century realities. However the G20 will never include the non-state actors that increasingly drive 
global public policies. No place allows governments, NGOs, think tanks and the private sector to 
discuss global issues in a structured way: neither the United Nations, the OECD, the Bretton 
Woods institutions nor the Global compact can claim this role. Building and structuring this 
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dialogue could help shaping the discourses that will move the collective discussion forward in 
finding collective solutions to 21
st century challenges.   
The Davos ‗World Economic Forum‘ and the ‗World Social Forum‘ have taken on important 
roles in recent years. Every year, they keep the momentum on crucial elements of the global 
economic and social agendas. They allow for very different actors involved in the corporate or 
non-governmental  communities  to  meet,  cross  perspectives  and  gather  around  collective 
interests.  
Global public policies could have their own annual forum. They are not in need of yet another 
high-level summit where heads of state sign bulky treaties and read out pre-negotiated speeches, 
but rather of an open forum covering the whole spectrum of global public policies. This forum 
would  bring  together  the  diverse  actors  of  international  cooperation  (NGOs,  bilateral  and 
multilateral organisations, foundations, think tanks, the media, etc.), and thus give an occasion to 
exit the policy silos in which each section of international cooperation menaces to embark.  
Such meetings would progressively help crystallise coalitions of actors around common topics of 
interest. They would also provide platforms for new ideas to be voiced, evaluation results to be 
shared, and innovative schemes to find funding. This mutli-actor discussion would gradually 






th century institutions of global governance to 21
st century hypercollective action is a 
huge challenge, for which no silver bullet will be found. While it did not aim to offer solutions, 
we hope that this exploratory journey in the world of global public policies has helped uncover 
some of the systemic causes for  the persistent  difficulties  in  reaching  effective  international 
collective action – causes that are often overlooked when devising policy responses.  
Our intuition is that the long road towards effective hypercollective action is full of wrong turns 
that risk extending the journey considerably – as well as its cost. In the era of global public 
policies, international policymakers ought to stay clear of traditional solutions to invent a new 
generation of collaborative processes more compatible with the new political economy of global 
public policies as they are shaping up in these early years of the 21
st century. If there is any hope 
in brining more coherence to the chaos that characterises international cooperation initiatives, we 
believe that it will be through the patient knitting of the five modes of collaboration that we have 
identified as constituting the fabric of effective hypercollective action: rules and engagements, 
norms and standards, systems of incentives, information and discourses as well as networks and 
partnerships.   
If this is true, then the road map begins to clarify. Although the measures suggested above are far 
from sufficient, concrete actions can be taken to:  
-  progressively expand the scope of the Paris Declaration process to deliver on other global 
public policies than traditional development aid, while shifting the focus away from rules 
and norms of ‗harmonization‘ towards processes of convergence;  
-  devise incentives for cooperation – which implies turning multilateral actors into funders 
and rewarders of convergence; 
-  imagine ‗sticks‘ to give teeth to the coherence agenda, for instance by spreading ‗global‘ 
evaluation through the intermediary of an evaluation platform; 44 
 
-  create  common  standards  of  measurement,  which  would  allow  for  the  measure  of 
traditional development aid to converge with the measures of global policy finance;  
-  inform  the  policy  by  creating  common  public  information  campaigns  and  cognitive 
frameworks, which could be confronted in yearly ‗Davos summits‘ of global policies.  
  